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I. INTRODUCTION
In his momentous essay The Path of the Law, Oliver Wendell
Holmes observed that "[t]he law is the witness and the external de-
posit" of the moral life of a nation.' Holmes argued that no matter
whether an individual believes that the law emanates from a sover-
eign or from the legislature, there is a constant inquiry into the ra-
tionale and principles laid down by the judge who interprets the law.'
According to Holmes, this search for reason reflects a fallacy that
suggests "that the only force at work in the development of the law is
logic."3 The vitality of Holmes' observation strikes with particular
force upon examination of recent developments in judicial application
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1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
2. See id. at 465.
3. Id.
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of antidiscrimination laws. One such application is the United States
Supreme Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.4
In Hicks, the Court held that a plaintiff must prove intentional
discrimination to be entitled to judgment in a Title VII disparate
treatment employment discrimination lawsuit.5 A plaintiff must af-
firmatively show that the employer was motivated by the plaintiffs
race, religion, color, sex, or national origin as proscribed by Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in making the challenged employment
decision. 7 The Hicks decision attracted significant attention from civil
rights activists and women's groups8 and has generated a large body
of scholarship on the merits, or otherwise, of the decision.9 The bulk
of this reaction was negative.
4. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
5. See id. at 514. Under the Court's analysis, there are two ways a plaintiff could ob-
tain a judgment. First, as a matter of law and pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure 50(a)(1) or 52(c), a court must award judgment to the plaintiff if a rational person
would find that the evidence presented constitutes a prima facie case, and the defendant
failed to meet its burden of production by not introducing evidence "which, taken as true,
would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
[employment decision]." Id. at 509. Second, a plaintiff is entitled to judgment if the defense
fails to sustain its burden, and the factfinder determines that the prima facie case is sup-
ported by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 510 n.3. "It is not enough, in other
words, to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiffs explanation of
intentional discrimination." Id. at 519.
6. 42U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1994).
7. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11.
8. See, e.g., Management, Civil Rights Attorneys Differ on Effect of Hicks Decision,
1993 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 126, at C-1 (July 2, 1993) (reporting that civil rights at-
torneys interpret the Hicks decision as increasing a plaintiffs difficulty of prevailing in a
discrimination action); Joan Biskupic, High Court Ends Session on Note of Conservatism,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 4, 1993, at B8 (contending that the majority's rewrite of long-
standing interpretations of federal laws barring job discrimination pleased businesses but
angered civil rights activists); Overburdened: The Supreme Court Has Made It Too Difficult
to Prove Bias: The Congress Must Act, NEWSDAY, July 1, 1993, at 54 (claiming that the out-
rageous decision calls for the immediate attention of Clinton and Congress to rescue truth
and justice); David G. Savage, Justices Rule Fired Workers Must Prove Bias, L.A. TIMES,
June 26, 1993, at Al (quoting the director of the Women's Rights Project for the American
Civil Liberties Union as stating that "this is going to make it next to impossible for dis-
crimination complainants to win").
9. See, e.g., Robert Brookins, Hicks, Lies, and Ideology: The Wages of Sin is Now Ex-
culpation, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939 (1995) (arguing that the Court has eroded eviden-
tiary and procedural rules for employment discrimination cases to create an unfair advan-
tage for employers); William R. Corbett, The "Fall" of Summers, The Rise of "Pretext Plus,"
and the Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to Employ-
ment at Wilt: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305 (1996) (arguing that
Hicks and McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995), subordinate
positive law enacted by Congress to the common law doctrine of employment-at-will); De-
velopments in the Law-Employment Discrimination, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1568, 1579-1602
(1996) [hereinafter Developments] (arguing that Hicks did not resolve the debate over what
a plaintiff must prove in an employment discrimination lawsuit); Robert J. Smith, The Ti-
tle VII Pretext Question: Resolved in Light of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 70 IND. L.J.
281, 304 (1994). Smith argues that the decision presents "the most balanced approach to
deciding Title VII claims by not unfairly assuming that an employer's employment action
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The Hicks decision is understood as having altered the procedural
process of Title VII race discrimination cases in favor of employers.' 0
Because plaintiffs are not entitled to a judgment even if they prove
that the reason proffered by the employer for the adverse employ-
ment decision is merely a pretext for discrimination, commentators
have interpreted Hicks as endorsing the "pretext-plus" rule." Re-
gardless of how the Hicks decision is understood, the Supreme
Court's imprimatur legitimized the pretext-plus rule while also
making it the law of the land.
In a narrowly legal sense, the Supreme Court's decision in Hicks,
based on the precedents of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green'2 and
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,3 is appropriate
because the plaintiff ultimately bears the burden of proving inten-
tional discrimination.' 4 However, the Hicks decision has a broader
substantive effect of sacrificing the struggle for a discrimination-free
work environment on the altar of procedure. Some scholars rational-
ized Hicks as a decision that reaffirms the potency of the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine in the United States.'" Some argue that Hicks
was correctly decided because the procedural rules of burden shifting
as applied by the Court do not unfairly assume the presence of dis-
crimination. 16 Others argue that McDonnell Douglas and Burdine
never established a framework that mandated judgment for a plain-
was discriminatory while alleviating civil rights activists' concerns about needing 'plus'
proof of discrimination and the difficulty of surviving the summary judgment stage." Id.
10. See Corbett, supra note 9, at 351-52 (arguing that the Court's claim of a lack of
authority to impose liability on an employer absent positive proof of discrimination is, in
reality, an affirmance of the majority's preference for employment-at-will).
11. See id. at 345. "Pretext plus" originated in Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, 683
F. Supp. 596, 631 (W.D. Tex. 1988). Catherine J. Lanctot used the phrases "pretext-plus"
and "pretext-only" in her article, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of
the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 66
(1991).
12. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
13. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
14. See id. at 253. In McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, the Court developed a proce-
dural model for framing the factual issues and allocating the burdens of proof in a Title VII
disparate treatment lawsuit to enable the plaintiff to prove her case with circumstantial
evidence. See id. The Burdine Court stressed that the plaintiff maintains the burden of
persuasion throughout the lawsuit and must be given a fair opportunity to prove discrimi-
nation. See id. The plaintiffs successful prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption
that the employer intentionally discriminated. See id. After establishing a prima facie case,
the burden of production shifts to the employer to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its adverse employment decision. See id. Thereafter, the plaintiff has the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate that.the employer's articulated reason is pretextual by proving that
the reason was not true or not the real reason. See id. at 256.
15. See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 9, at 330 (arguing that the Supreme Court has re-
fused to displace the employment-at-will doctrine to the extent necessary to effectuate the
objectives of antidiscrimination laws and that employment-at-will has "won so many bat-
tles before the Supreme Court that the war may almost be over").
16. See Smith, supra note 9, at 304.
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tiff once pretext has been proven. 17 According to this argument, the
Hicks decision is doctrinally correct, and the problem lies with the
precedents on which the decision rests."' Meanwhile, other scholars
criticize the Hicks decision for the procedural burdens imposed on
plaintiffs and the resulting adverse consequences. 9
I argue that Hicks is doctrinally correct but suggest that a more
important development than the reaffirmation of the employment-at-
will doctrine was taking place in the Court. While a practical impact
of the decision is to limit the use of inferences to prove discrimina-
tion, Hicks reflects the subtle, but increasingly palpable, societal
conviction that race is no longer the problem that it was at the time
of Title VII's enactment. In other words, a partial impact of Hicks is
that a plaintiff in a Title VII race discrimination action must now
overcome an unspoken presumption of a race-neutral workplace by
proving that there is a causal link between race and the adverse em-
ployment decision. 0 Seen in this light, the implications of the Hicks
decision go far beyond the workplace to reflect deep-seated percep-
tions and deliberate skepticism about the pervasiveness of race-
based decision making in the workplace. Superficially neutral evi-
dence rules, as applied by the Court, leave the goal of equal treat-
ment to the workings of a litigation structure that is based on an as-
sumption that equality is the norm in the American workplace. In
addition, the Hicks decision falsely assumes that the phenomenon of
discrimination can be determined through application of a defined
set of either evidentiary or procedural rules, or both. Not only is the
framework endorsed in Hicks inadequate to address or reflect the na-
ture of discrimination and the various ways that discriminatory ani-
mus may be expressed, it also undermines the integrity of decision
17. See Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93
MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2269 (1995) (arguing that the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine proof
structure was flawed because the prima facie case standard was inadequate in a substan-
tial category of cases).
18. See id.
19. See Sherie L. Coons, Proving Disparate Treatment After St. Mary's Honor Center
v. Hicks: Is Anything Left of McDonnell Douglas?, 19 J. CORP. L. 379, 412-14 (1994) (dis-
cussing perceived inconsistencies in the Court's analysis in Hicks); Thomas A. Cunniff, The
Price of Equal Opportunity: The Efficiency of Title VII After Hicks, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
507, 540-41 (1995) (stating that direct evidence of racial discrimination is very difficult to
obtain); Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Co-
herent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1455, 1458-59 (1996) (stating that
Hicks distorts twenty years of Supreme Court precedent and is an unfair approach to civil
rights law).
20. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 534-35 (1993) (Souter, J., dis-
senting). Justice Souter noted that the majority opinion essentially mandates direct evi-
dence to satisfy a framework predicated on the absence of direct evidence and that "[tihe
majority's scheme greatly disfavors Title VII plaintiffs without the good luck to have direct
evidence of discriminatory intent." Id.
[Vol. 26:49
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making because it artificially constrains factfinding 1 This vitiates
the viability and legitimacy of the legal process as a means of evalu-
ating and ascertaining the truth (or otherwise) of a discrimination
claim. Although procedure is generally invaluable in the search for
truth through the legal systenf, the procedure affirmed by the Hicks
decision detracts from, if not completely undermines, the ends for
which it exists, namely truth and justice for all.
As critical as the above issues are, however, the Hicks message is
far more portentous. Hicks and its progenitors reflect the success of a
flawed egalitarian ideal, despite liberal egalitarianism's efforts to
transform American society into one in which an individual's status
is not the primary determinant of his or her destiny. 2 Although ideas
of an egalitarian society partially informed this nation's political
21. See Malamud, supra note 17, at 2236-37. Malamud astutely observes that "to ac-
cord legal significance to the plaintiffs satisfaction of the 'requirements' of the prima facie
case 'stage' and the pretext 'stage' of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine is to engage in an act of
misplaced concreteness. The world of practice under McDonnell Douglas-Burdine remains
a disorderly one, in which the assignment of categories of facts to 'stages' of the case is un-
stable." Id. at 2237.
22. The exclusion of African Americans from the principles enunciated in the Declara-
tion of Independence, and enshrined in the Constitution, was manifested in the infamous
Dred Scott decision where the Supreme Court held that blacks could not sue in U.S. courts
and that Congress could not prohibit slavery in the Territories. See Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393, 432-54 (1856) (Dred Scott). The Dred Scott decision explicitly formal-
ized the social reality that, although free, former slaves and their descendants were not
deemed equal in the eyes of society and, ultimately, in the eyes of the law. In the decades
that followed Dred Scott, the struggle for equality dominated the American landscape, be-
ginning with the Civil War, the enactment of the Civil War amendments, the civil rights
movement, and culminating in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. These victories, while sweet
and certainly hard won, nonetheless have fallen short of the goal of ensuring that equality
is the reality of American society and the American workplace. The egalitarian ideals of
the Constitution have ostensibly been extended to minorities throughout the nation, but
the realization of equality as the norm in life remains a distant goal. See James U. Black-
sher, Dred Scott's Unwon Freedom" The Redistricting Cases as Badges of Slavery, 39 How.
L.J. 633, 659 (1996) (arguing that the Constitution relegated African Americans to a sub-
ordinate status because of unanswered questions dating back to Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 393 (1856), Plessy v. Ferguson, 13 U.S. 537 (1896), and The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883), and which result in a modern badge of slavery); Juan Williams, The
Survival of Racism Under the Constitution, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 7, 8, 10-14 (1992) (af-
firming claims that the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were defective
from their inceptions, allowed racial injustice to exist under the rule of law they created,
and resulted in the perversion of egalitarian ideals); see also Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of
Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 237 (1971) (noting that while antidis-
crimination laws are largely an attempt to secure equality for African Americans, "the de-
sire to help blacks is qualified" because the laws do not specify any particular race or color
and because the law requires only that employers refrain from using race as a basis for de-
cision making). Fiss argues that the use of race as a criterion for decision making would
only impair productivity, both for the individual businessman as well as for society at
large. See id. Fiss concludes, however, that the two qualifications "make the conferral of
benefits on blacks particularly palatable, ethically and politically, to the political majority."
Id.
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birth,23 the pattern of resource allocation was, and continues to be,
heavily influenced by the status rules that supported the flawed
egalitarian model. Although more subtle in their operation today,
these rules informed the early political, social, and economic struc-
ture of American society and remain a part of our national fabric,
just as they were over two centuries ago.
This Article, applying Henry Sumner Maine's status to contract
theory24 and using the Hicks decision as its context, examines the
formal re-emergence of status. Maine argued that in progressive so-
cieties, law reflects free will as manifested in the relationships that
define rights and duties between individuals as well as between indi-
viduals and society." Thus, relationships in these progressive socie-
ties are increasingly governed by contract (free will) and not status
(relationships determined by what caste into which an individual
was born).
Status is a term of social standing relative to the larger commu-
nity.21 It defines the rights, duties, capacities, and incapacities that
determine a person's membership in a given class.27 Status estab-
lishes a legal personal relationship, neither temporary in nature nor
terminable at the mere will of the parties. 8 This Article argues that
status has re-emerged as a primary determinant of access to eco-
nomic resources. In this sense, status is preserved through certain
legal standards, including those that have been used to explain or
23. Equality of natural rights, but not social and political rights, informed this na-
tion's political birth. For example, although President Lincoln disagreed with the Dred
Scott decision, he did not go so far as to recognize procedural and substantive equality for
all:
I think the authors of that notable instrument [Declaration of Independence]
intended to include all men, but they did not intend to declare all men equal in
all respects. They did not mean to say all were equal in color, size, intellect,
moral developments, or social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinct-
ness, in what respects they did consider all men created equal-equal in 'cer-
tain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness.' This they said, and this meant. They did not mean to assert the obvious
untruth, that all were then actually enjoying that equality, nor yet, that they
were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact they had no power to
confer such a boon. They meant simply to declare the right, so that the en-
forceinent of it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit. They meant
to set up a standard maxim for free society, which should be familiar to all, and
revered by all; constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though
never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly
spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness and
value of life to all people of all colors everywhere.
Abraham Lincoln, Speech on the Dred Scott Decision at Springfield, Ill. .(June 26, 1857), in
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1832-1858, at 398 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed.,
1989).
24. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 164-65 (1861).
25. See id.




justify the Hicks decision. As employed in Hicks and other cases,
these standards help preserve the role of status as an indicator for
resource allocation.
Part II of this Article discusses the Hicks decision in light of the
employment-at-will doctrine. It concludes that Hicks may be ration-
alized as a reflection of the importance of the at-will doctrine, but
posits that upon closer examination, Hicks may have undermined the
strength of the at-will doctrine by requiring an employer to produce a
reason for firing an employee. Part III critiques the central role of
the intent requirement in discrimination cases. It discusses the na-
ture of discrimination and the need to develop a legal standard that
makes feasible the task of proving that an adverse decision was the
result of discrimination. Part IV examines the evidentiary concerns
at issue in Hicks. It focuses on the role and effect of presumptions2 9
and shows how alternative approaches, derived from other areas of
law, will serve Title VII's purposes far better than the framework
provided in Hicks. These approaches are also likely to minimize the
effect of status on an individual's potential for economic and profes-
sional success. Finally, Part V concludes that although the progeny of
Hicks conform to the legal doctrine established therein, both Hicks
and its progeny are undiscerning of the underlying premise that al-
lows discrimination to prosper in an employment situation, that is,
the presumption that all employees are treated equal.
II. ANTECEDENTS: STATUS, CONTRACT, AND HICKS AS AN
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DECISION
In Hicks, the plaintiff Melvin Hicks, a black man and a former
shift commander at a halfway house, brought suit against his em-
ployer alleging that the employer took adverse employment actions
against him because of his race in violation of Title VII.31 Mr. Hicks
had maintained a satisfactory work record until January 1984 when
John Powell, a white man, became his supervisor." Beginning on
March 3, 1984, and lasting through June 7, 1984, the day he was
fired, Mr. Hicks was cited for various incidents involving violations of
workplace rules.32 Mr. Hicks was disciplined, demoted, and finally
terminated.33 In his place, the employer hired a white male.14
29. See infra notes 217-21 and accompanying text for a clarification of the term "pre-
sumption." The conflicted use and application of the word "presumption" by the Supreme
Court contributes significantly to the difficulty encountered by plaintiffs in proving dis-
crimination. A proper use of the terminology employed when dealing with evidentiary
standards and rules will greatly ease the confusion that current usage has engendered.




34. See id. at 506.
1998]
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Mis-
souri found that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of racial
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.35 The plaintiff
was a member of a protected class; he had performed his job satisfac-
torily; he was terminated, and the employer replaced him with a
white male.3 6 The court also found that the defendant/employer re-
butted the presumption of discrimination by proffering two non-
discriminatory reasons for the adverse decisions 7 and that these
nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual.31 Nevertheless, the dis-
trict court held that the plaintiff failed to prove that the adverse ac-
tions were racially motivated and entered judgment for the em-
ployer. 9 The district court conceded that Mr. Powell was determined
to terminate Mr. Hicks, but the court believed that Mr. Powell's rea-
son may have been motivated by personal animosity rather than dis-
crimination.
41
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
ruling and held that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law once he proved that the proffered reasons for the adverse
decision were pretextual.41 The circuit court found that the district
court erred in entertaining the possibility that personal animosity
was the reason behind the termination when the defendants never
actually stated such a reason or offered evidence to support it.4
2
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth
Circuit's decision and held that a plaintiff in a Title VII action must
show that the adverse decision was motivated by intentional dis-
crimination based on race.43 The Court agreed with the district court
that the burden of persuasion requires a plaintiff to show that the
challenged employment decision was racially rather than personally
motivated." The Court conceded that the employer's proffered non-
discriminatory reasons were pretextual and that the prima facie case
35. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
36. See id. at 1249-50.
37. See id. at 1250 (finding that the defendant employer successfully demonstrated
that the plaintiff had committed sufficiently severe internal policy violations to warrant
his dismissal). The defendant asserted that on one occasion, Mr. Hicks failed to supervise
his subordinates who then abandoned their posts. This failure of Hicks to supervise his
subordinates "left St. Mary's vulnerable to escape or knavery by the inmates." Id. The de-
fendant also asserted that Hicks's violations were sufficient in number and frequency to
justify his termination. See id.
38. See id. at 1251 (finding that the supervisor provoked the confrontation between
the plaintiff and his supervisor and that the plaintiff was either singled out for harsh dis-
cipline or was the only employee disciplined at all).
39 See id. at 1252.
40. See id. at 1251-52.
41. See Hicks v. St Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992).
42. See id.




might have been sufficient to rule in favor of the plaintiff. However,
the Court concluded that nothing compelled such a ruling." Accord-
ing to the Court, the presumption of discrimination "drops out of the
picture" once the burden of production has been met by the defen-
dant.4" At this stage, the issue becomes whether the plaintiff proved
that the defendant discriminated against him because of his race.47
A. The At- Will Rule and Its Boundaries
An easy, almost instinctive, reaction to Hicks is to justify the deci-
sion in light of the core principle of American employment law,
namely the employment-at-will doctrine. 48 The at-will doctrine states
that an employer may hire or fire an employee for any reason: good
reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.49 Absent contractual provi-
sions that substantively limit the employer's prerogative to termi-
nate an employee for any or no cause, an employer is generally not
required to provide an explanation for its decision to terminate an
employee at any point during the employment relationship. 50 Al-
45. Seeid.at5ll.
46. Id.at510-11.
47. See id. at 511.
48. For an early formulation of the at-will doctrine, see HORACE G. WOOD, ON THE
LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (1877). The first reported case applying the at-will doctrine
is Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad, 81 Tenn. 507 (Tenn. 1884), overruled on other
grounds by Hutton v. Walters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915). In Payne, an agent of the defen-
dant, Western & Atlantic Railroad, ordered its employees not to trade with the plaintiff,
who owned a store near the railroad's depot. See id. at 509-10. The order included a threat
of discharge for any employee who continued to trade with the plaintiff. See id. at 511. Al-
though the plaintiff sued in tort, see id. at 510-11, the court resolved the conflict using
principles of contract law:
If the employees are engaged for fixed terms, it may be assumed that a dis-
charge by the employer for such a reason would be unwarranted, and would
give the employe[e] an action for breach of contract. But no one else, except a
privy, could complain of the breach of contract, and the ground of the em-
ploye[e]'s action would be the refusal of the employer to pay him for the period
promised in the contract of service. If the service is terminable at the option of
either party, it is plain no action would lie even to the employe[e]; for either
party may terminate the service, for any cause, good or bad, or without cause,
and the other cannot complain in law ....
Id. at 517. The court further stated that while actions such as the defendant's may be mor-
ally wrong,
the law can adopt and maintain no such standards for judging human conduct;
and men must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they please,
and to discharge or retain employe[e]s at will for good cause or for no cause, or
even for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se.
Id. at 518.
49. See David Walsh & Joshua Schwarz, State Common Law Wrongful Discharge Doc-
trines: Up-date, Refinement, and Rationales, 33 AM. BuS. L.J. 645, 646 (1996).
50. In addition to contractual provisions stating that an employee will be terminated
only for just cause, most jurisdictions have recognized a public policy exception to the at-
will doctrine. See generally David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corpo-
rate Law Reform: Employment-at-Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 1041
n.41 (1998) (citing MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAw 54-53 (1994)). Courts
1998]
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though the legitimacy of the at-will doctrine as an expression of
American law has faced some challenge," the rule nonetheless con-
tinues to thrive as a cardinal principle of employment relations.
Over the years, courts have developed several ways to limit the
power of arbitrary and capricious termination embodied in the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine.12 The most important of these limitations
is the public policy exception. This exception, stated generally, pro-
vides relief for an employee who is terminated for performing an act
that public policy would encourage or for refusing to perform an act
that public policy would discourage. 3 For example, the exception ex-
tends to impose liability in a wide range of contexts where an em-
ployee is discharged for disclosing illegal activities of an employer;5 4
exercising a statutory right, such as filing a worker's compensation
claim; 5 or refusing to violate a penal statute.56 The scope of the pub-
lic policy exception varies considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion, and courts have been active in prescribing the contours of the
exception as it applies to state policy. 57 There is no doubt that at the
have also relied on tort and implied contractual theories to limit an employer's power over
an employee. See, e.g., Tatge v. Chambers & Owens, Inc., 565 N.W.2d 150, 152 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1997) (relying on implied contractual theory); Continental Coffee Prod. Co. v. Caza-
rez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 453 (Tex. 1996) (relying on tort theory).
51. See Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 118, 118 (1976). Feinman argues that from the very beginning, the at-will
doctrine was inconsistent with master-servant law and contract doctrine. See id. He argues
that Horace Wood's treatise on master-servant law was wrong in several respects. See id.
at 126. First, the cases cited by Wood as supportive of the employment-at-will rule were
"far off the mark." Id. Secondly, Wood clearly misstated the law applied by American
courts at the time, and lastly, according to Feinman, Wood offered no policy reasons to
support the rule he stated so absolutely. See id.
52. See Walsh & Schwarz, supra note 49, at 646-47.
53. See, e.g., Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., Inc., 653 F.2d 1057, 1061-62 (5th
Cir. 1981); Cloutier v. The Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1143 (N.H. 1981).
54. See, e.g., Belline v. K-Mart Corp., 940 F.2d 184, 190 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that
Illinois public policy protects employees who report unlawful conduct to their employer).
55. See, e.g., Douglas v. Wilson, 774 P.2d 1356, 1358-59 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (recog-
nizing a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine where an employee is
discharged for filing a worker's compensation claim).
56. See, e.g., Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P,2d 25, 27-28 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1959).
57. For example, the Virginia Supreme Court recently held that an employer's termi-
nation of an employee shortly after she returned from maternity leave was a violation of
Virginia public policy. See Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc., 480 S.E.2d 502, 505 (Va. 1997).
Conversely, the Oklahoma Supreme Court recently held that the public policy exception to
the at-will doctrine does not apply to an employee claiming constructive discharge due to
sexual harassment at work. See Marshall v. OK Rental & Leasing, Inc., 939 P.2d 1116,
1119 (Okla. 1997). The court re-emphasized that in Oklahoma, the public policy exception
applies "in a narrow class of cases in which the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of
public policy as articulated by constitutional, statutory or decisional law .... In light of the
vague meaning of the term public policy we believe the public policy exception must be
tightly circumscribed." Id. at 1119 (quoting Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 29 (Okla.
1989)); accord Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519, 527-28 (Colo.
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federal level a clear public policy exists against discrimination. This
policy is embodied in Title VII and other federal antidiscrimination
statutes.58 Most states have incorporated this federal policy in state
statutes, modeled on Title VII, to prohibit discrimination on a variety
of grounds.5 9 Under the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine,
however, there is no uniform pattern for treating discrimination
claims. While some courts have permitted plaintiffs to bring dis-
crimination claims under the state public policy exception, 60 others
have not.6 1
Contract theory has also engendered some limitations on an em-
ployer's ability to terminate an employee arbitrarily. Courts in sev-
eral jurisdictions have held that employee manuals create an implied
contract of employment.6 2 Oral assurances of job security, combined
with other factors, such as consistently high job evaluations, promo-
tions, and longevity on the job have been held to create a quasi-
contract, thereby limiting the at-will doctrine. 3 Traditional torts,
1996) (holding that the discharge of an accountant for refusing to violate rules of profes-
sional conduct is a violation of public policy).
58. See 2 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. 1995) (providing rights and protections to legislative
personnel under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990); 5 U.S.C. § 7204 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination in government
employment); 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994) (prohibiting sex discrimination in federally financed
education programs); 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994) (prohibiting age discrimination in employ-
ment); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (prohibiting the deprivation of civil rights).
59. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 29-4-3 (1975) (prohibiting racial, religious, and sexual dis-
crimination of legislative employees); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1463 (1996) (prohibiting em-
ployment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, age, handicap, or national ori-
gin).
60. See, e.g., Bailey, 480 S.E.2d at 505 (holding that a plaintiff may rely on the public
policy exception, even in the absence of a specific statute identifying such a protected pol-
icy).
61. See, e.g., Marshall, 939 P.2d at 1120 (refusing to recognize a common law claim
for constructive discharge in violation of public policy where the claim is predicated on the
employee's status rather than her conduct).
62. See, e.g., Brodie v. General Chem. Corp., 112 F.3d 440, 444 (10th Cir. 1997) (find-
ing that additional consideration, other than continued employment, is needed for an em-
ployer to unilaterally revoke or modify a handbook that creates an employment contract);
Thompson v. American Motor Inns, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 409, 413, 418 (W.D. Va. 1985) (find-
ing that the employment-at-will doctrine is a "rebuttable presumption and not a substan-
tive rule of law" and holding that a warning procedure included in an employee handbook
created an implied unilateral contract); Barger v. General Elec. Co., 599 F. Supp. 1154,
1161 (W.D. Va. 1984) (holding that an employee handbook can create an enforceable
promise).
63. See, e.g., Dumas v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n., 473 N.W.2d 652, 655 (Mich. 1991) (stat-
ing that an implied contract limiting an employer's right to discharge employees at will
may arise from the employer's oral promise to employees); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 890 (Mich. 1980) (finding that oral statements by an employer or
its agents regarding job security may form the basis of an enforceable promise not to dis-
charge without good or just cause); Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150, 154
(Ohio 1985) (stating that oral representations, handbooks, and company policies comprise
components of an employment contract).
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such as interference with contractual relations, have also been used
to impose liability on an employer who wrongfully discharges an em-
ployee.6
4
In addition to the contract and tort law limitations on the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine, Title VII prohibits an employer from
making adverse employment decisions regarding an employee's com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of
the employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.65 Title
VII's proscriptions, like the common law tort or contract causes of ac-
tion, may be viewed broadly as exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine. The relative strength of these exceptions is determined ul-
timately by federal courts, which are responsible for interpreting the
scope of Title VII, and state courts, which evaluate the propriety of
contract and tort-based causes of action. Undoubtedly, the common
law causes of action are easier to curtail by state courts than are Ti-
tle VII causes of action by federal courts.6 6 However, as Hicks demon-
strates, the application of procedural rules of burden shifting may
engender the same results at the federal level as a narrowly con-
strued common law cause of action in terms of a plaintiffs success in
wrongful discharge cases. Thus, despite its limitations, the at-will
doctrine continues to thrive as the dominant rule of law whether its
articulation is explicit, through the application of common law, or
implicit, through the procedural rules applied under Title VII.6 1 In
tort-based causes of action, plaintiffs are certain of success only in
the most egregious fact patterns.68 In contract cases, plaintiffs are
64. See Kumpf v. Steinhaus, 779 F.2d 1323, 1324 (7th Cir. 1985); Capiello v. Ragen
Precision Indus., Inc., 471 A.2d 432, 434 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
66. This is because common law causes of action may be narrowly construed where
the issue is discrimination. Judges, who want to keep discrimination cases from funneling
through tort or contract law, have more leeway to limit or restrict cases brought under
these theories.
67. See Corbett, supra note 9, at 351-52 (arguing that the at-will doctrine implicitly
survives through the Court's interpretation in Hicks). Some scholars have advocated a sin-
gle just-cause rule to replace the various exceptions to the at-will doctrine. See, e.g., Donald
C. Robinson, The First Decade of Judicial Interpretation of the Montana Wrongful Dis-
charge from Employment Act (WDEA), 57 MONT. L. REV. 375, 380 (1996) C[P]ublic employ-
ees may have a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment if
there is some contract, rule, regulation, or law which infers a specified term of employment
or a 'just cause' requirement for discipline or termination."). But see Todd H. Girshon,
Wrongful Discharge Reform in the United State&" International and Domestic Perspectives
on the Model Employment Termination Act, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 635, 704 (1992) ('[T]o
the extent that just cause imposes an unrealistically rigorous standard of review, applied
liberally to most employees through relatively short qualifying periods, as in the Canadian
Federal sector, the statutory right could arguably translate into an institutionalization of
mediocre performance.").
68. See Nicolle R. Lipper, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Comparative Study
of Great Britain and the United States, 13 COMP. LAB. L.J. 293, 300 (1992) (explaining that
many tort-based causes of action require the plaintiff to prove physical harm or that the
harassing conduct was extreme and outrageous).
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assured of success only where enough elements of a quasi-contract
relationship will withstand the test of specificity required under con-
tract rules.69
While plaintiffs employing the recognized exceptions to the rule
have enjoyed some success, the limits imposed by tort and contract
are easily manipulated by an employer who ultimately retains con-
trol over the circumstances that lead to termination, particularly in
the area of contract . 7 For example, assuming the facts of Hicks to be
true and that the plaintiff had an employment contract stating that
termination would be only for just cause, the outcome of the case still
would have favored the defendant. The plaintiffs conduct of threat-
ening his supervisor is, under most circumstances, a sufficient reason
to justify discharge. This would be true even though the trier of fact
found that the defendant manufactured the circumstances leading to
the altercation to get the plaintiff to react in the threatening man-
ner.
71
B. The At-Will Rule in the Age of Modernity
The employment-at-will doctrine has remained intact despite
various legislative and judicial attempts to dilute its potency. The
underpinnings of the rule appeal overtly to the principle of freedom
69. See, e.g., Walker v. Modern Realty, Inc., 675 F.2d 1002, 1003 (8th Cir. 1982) (con-
cluding that language used in a letter agreeing to employ the plaintiff was sufficiently
clear to form an enforceable contract); Pine River State Bank v. Metille, 333 N.W. 2d 622,
633 (Minn. 1983) (holding that provisions of an employee handbook limiting the employer's
ability to terminate its employees were contractually binding and that the employee was
wrongfully terminated contrary to those provisions). Because some courts have rejected the
view that an obligation to discharge an employee in good faith should be implied in an at-
will employment contract, only extreme situations have warranted a public policy excep-
tion. For example, in Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr- 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981),
an employee who was terminated after 32 years of employment prevailed in a wrongful
discharge claim because the employer breached an implied promise not to act arbitrarily.
The court found that an enforceable promise arose from the duration of employment, the
promotions the employee received, the lack of criticism, and the employer's policies. See id.
70. See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc 491 A.2d 1257, 1270-71 (N.J. 1985),
modified on other grounds by Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 499 A.2d 515 (N.J.
1985) (holding that where an employer distributes an employee handbook specifying the
reasons for and procedures by which an employee may be terminated, the employer may
avoid the resultant contractual significance of those provisions by including a prominent
statement in the handbook to the effect that employment remains at will).
71. In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), the plaintiff was fired
after his supervisor manufactured an altercation that provoked the plaintiff to threaten
him. See id. at 508; cf. Gaglidari v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 815 P.2d 1362, 1368 (Wash.
1991) (finding that an employee handbook created an employment contract, but that if the
employee violated the provision prohibiting fighting on company premises, immediate dis-
missal was justified). The Hicks Court found for the defendantlemployer even though the
behavior in question was an attempt to protect the employer's interests. See Hicks, 509
U.S. at 524.
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of contract,7 2 which is founded upon cherished ideals of equality and
individual will. 73 In addition, the definition of property, which was
expanded in the late nineteenth century to include freedom of con-
tract, unwittingly solidified the status of those who could not legally
or easily own property at this point in history. This result was, in
some ways, foreseen by those who contributed to the Progressive cri-
tique of the laissez-faire principle of economy-a principle supported
by the conviction that a free market system would best distribute re-
sources in society. 74 As Roscoe Pound pointed out in his prominent
article Liberty of Contract, the freedom of contract concept presumes
equal rights between potential market actors, specifically employers
and employees.7 5 In Pound's time, this concept was, as Pound in-
sisted, clearly out of touch with social realities.7 6
The Progressive critique was justified in Lochner v. New York,77 in
which the Supreme Court held that a maximum-hours law for bakers
was an unconstitutional interference with freedom of contract, even
though bakers clearly could not bargain effectively with their more
powerful employers .7 The Lochner decision was surprising because
this "constitutionalization of freedom of contract . . . came after two
decades of astonishing change in the structure of the American econ-
omy that had resulted in the creation of giant corporations capable of
exercising enormously disproportionate market power."79 True "free-
dom of contract" could simply not be realized any more in the new
money economy than it had existed in the feudal economy.
72. See Feinman, supra note 51, at 118; see also Murphy v. American Home Prod.
Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89 (N.Y. 1983) (declining to recognize the tort of wrongful discharge
and holding that such a "significant change in [the] law is best left to the Legislature").
The court opined:
Those jurisdictions that have modified the traditional at-will rule appear to
have been motivated by conclusions that the freedom of contract underpinnings
of the rule have become outdated, that individual employees in the modern
work force do not have the bargaining power to negotiate security for the jobs
on which they have grown to rely, and that the rule yields harsh results for
those employees who do not enjoy the benefits of express contractual limita-
tions on the power of dismissal. Whether these conclusions are supportable or
whether for other compelling reasons employers should, as a matter of policy,
be held liable to at-will employees discharged in circumstances for which no li-
ability has existed at common law, are issues better left to resolution at the
hands of the Legislature.
Id. at 89,
73. PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 131 (1980).
74. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 184-94 (1965).
75. See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 463-64 (1909).
76. See id. at 482-87.
77. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
78. See id. at 64.




In 1872 the infamous Slaughter-House Cases80 marked the begin-
ning of a battle for an expansive definition of property. The battle re-
flected the breadth of the economic transformation taking place
during this era in American society. In essence, the transition from a
landed economy to an industrial economy marked a shift in sources
of capital accumulation and created new forms of property that re-
quired the protection of the law."' Indeed, the Supreme Court had
long conceded that the law recognized a property interest in certain
things "in the effort to meet the many new demands for justice inci-
dent to a rapidly changing civilization .... "s' The judicial instinct of
the courts, then and now, is to view incursions on the employment-
at-will doctrine as infringements on the employer's property rights.
The exceptions to the rule are thus applied as benevolent acts of eq-
uity, to be used only in those circumstances where conscience cannot
easily turn a blind eye. Roscoe Pound described the antecedents of
this "judicial currency:"
[Olur constitutional models and our bills of rights were drawn in
the period in which the natural law school of jurists was at its ze-
nith, and the growing period of American law coincided with the
high tide of individualistic ethics and economics. Hence, his school
course in political economy and his office reading of Blackstone
taught the nineteenth century judge the same things as funda-
mentals. He became persuaded that they were the basis of the ju-
ral order, and, as often happens, the individualist conception of
justice reached its complete logical development after the doctrine
itself had lost its vitality. Social justice, the last conception to de-
velop, had already begun to affect not merely legal thought but
legislation and judicial decision, while the courts were working out
the last extreme deductions from the older conception.
• . . As a result of our legal history, we exaggerate the importance
of property and of contract, as an incident thereof.... The absolute
certainty which is one of our legal ideals, an ideal responsible for
much that is irritatingly mechanical in our legal system, is de-
manded chiefly to protect property.8 3
Unequal bargaining power between property owners and non-
property owners was, and continues to be, inextricably linked to
status. Freedom of contract emphasized the exercise of individual
will. Yet, women, blacks, and other groups could not exercise their
"will" in relation to a wide variety of subjects, such as owning prop-
80. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
81. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 10-11 (1927);
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of
the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 357-67 (1980).
82. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 263 (1918) (recogniz-
ing a property right in newsgathering) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
83. Pound, supra note 75, at 460-61.
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erty or access to education or other "goods" available in the market-
place of the broader economy. Through the accretion of case law and,
later, statutes, this situation ostensibly changed. However, as Morris
Cohen pointed out in 1927, the American money economy, though
consciously developed in reaction to the British feudal economy, in
fact, substantially replicates it.84 In Adkins v. Children's Hospital,85
the Supreme Court held that a federal statute authorizing an ad-
ministrative board to set minimum wages for adult women in the
District of Columbia was unconstitutional.8 6 In his analysis of the
case, Cohen compared the modern money economy with "medieval-
ism" and "feudalism" where status governed social relations based on
property ownership. Cohen observed of the modern economy:
The state, which has an undisputed right to prohibit contracts
against public morals or public policy, is here declared to have no
right to prohibit contracts under which many receive wages less
than the minimum of subsistence, so that if they are not the ob-
jects of humiliating public or private charity, they become centres
of the physical and moral evils that result from systematic under-
feeding and degraded standards of life. Let me repeat I do not wish
here to argue the merits or demerits of the minimum wage deci-
sion. Much less am I concerned with any quixotic attempt to urge
England to go back to medievalism. But the two events together
show in strong relief how recent and in the main exceptional is the
extreme position of the laissez faire doctrine, which according to
the insinuation of Justice Holmes, has led the Supreme Court to
read Herbert Spencer's extreme individualism into the 14 t h
amendment, and according to others, has enacted Cain's motto,
"Am I my brother's keeper" as the supreme law of industry. Dean
Pound has shown that in making a property right out of the free-
dom to contract, the Supreme Court has stretched the meaning of
the term property to include what it has never before signified in
the law or jurisprudence of any civilized country. But whether this
extension is justified or not, it certainly means the passing of a
certain domain of sovereignty from the state to the private em-
ployer of labor, who now has the absolute right to discharge .... 1
Cohen concluded that the expanded definition of property removes
any question as to the "character of property as [a] sovereign power.
. in a commercial economy" and that "[t]he extent of the power over
the life of others ... is not fully appreciated by those who think of the
law as merely protecting men in their possession."8
84. See Cohen, supra note 81, at 9-11.
85. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
86. See id. at 559, 562. The purpose of the invalidated law was "Itlo protect women
and minors . . . from conditions detrimental to their health and morals, resulting from
wages which are inadequate to maintain decent standards of living." Id. at 541-42.
87. Cohen, supra note 81, at 10-11.
88. Id. at 12-13.
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The underpinnings of the employment-at-will doctrine mirror the
status regime that defined the employment relationship throughout
the nineteenth century. The at-will doctrine is not so much a reflec-
tion of the absence of contract as it is a reflection of property and
therefore status. Historically, laws regulating the employment rela-
tionship were determined by the status of workers as slaves, appren-
tices, married women, or free white men.89 With the dawn of the In-
dustrial Age, contracts repldced status as the source of regulation of
the employment relationship.9" However, this substitution of contract
for status as a source of rules for the employment relationship was a
substitution in form only. The reality of modern employment rela-
tions is that the terms of an employment contract serve an em-
ployee's interests only to the extent that the employee has a status
that enables negotiation of an employment contract that balances the
interests of the employer and the employee. 9 1 An employee's status
affects whether hiring will occur. It helps define the formation stage,
as well as the terms and conditions of employment. In an age when
most formal barriers have been abolished, status explains in part
why minority groups continue to find subtle, but powerful, barriers to
advancement in the workplace. 2
For the vast number of modern employees, the prospects of a con-
tract that assures just-cause protection are dependent upon the pe-
culiar characteristics of that employee, such as education and skill,
and the specialized nature of the job. Understandably, contract nego-
tiation as a mediating force between an employer and an employee is
often unavailable or ineffective for those groups of people who, for
89. See generally Pound, supra note 75 (arguing that, absent protective legislation,
employees cannot bargain on equal footing with employers).
90. See Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34, 34 (1917)
("[Tihe movement of progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from status to
contract." (quoting SIR HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 165 (1861))). Isaacs further noted that
in Anglo-American society, the same is true despite scholarly assertions to the contrary-
Observing that the difference between status and contract is "not one of kind, but one of
degree," Isaacs prophetically concludes that the "twentieth century is witnessing a reaction
back to status." Id. at 40.
91. For example, CEO's of large corporations, highly skilled individuals, and persons
employed in upper management positions, all have more leverage to negotiate the terms of
their employment contracts. The vast majority of American workers are either employed at
will or have employment contracts that are not necessarily the product of consensual nego-
tiation. See Joann S. Lublin, Pay for No Performances, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1998, at RI.
92. See Theresa M. Beiner, Do Reindeer Gaines Count as Terms, Conditions or Privi-
leges of Employment Under Title VII?, 37 B.C. L. REV. 643, 645 (1996) (discussing the in-
visible advantages not typically enjoyed by minorities in the workplace, such as lunch with
a supervisor or playing golf with the boss). See generally Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege
in the Workplace: The Missing Element in Antidiscrimination Law, 4 TEX. J. WOMEN & L.
171 (1995) (arguing that antidiscrimination law fails to address the effects of cultural val-
ues that assign privilege to maleness).
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varied reasons, are not in a position to wield negotiating power.9 3 For
example, in instances where the law implies a contract, the employer
still holds the sovereign prerogative to change the terms of the con-
tract.
9 4
Like her feudal counterparts, an at-will employee's economic fate
is determined by her at-will status-a status that may be altered
only by the property holder/employer. Consequently, as legal realists
pointed out long ago, the emphasis on the viability of a contract to
create mutually beneficial, consensual employment relationships is
misplaced, and its potential to equalize bargaining positions is exag-
gerated.9 A contract, on its own, cannot protect individual employees
from the rule of custom that allows arbitrary findings, unless the em-
ployer allows this protection.96 The existence of employer prerogative
under the employment-at-will doctrine is merely a function of the
employer's status as a property holder. Like the business judgment
rule, the employment-at-will doctrine serves to insulate employers
from questions regarding how they choose to run their business. This
reflects a reverent deference to what courts deem an employer's
privilege-to take any action that would further the business interest
of the corporation.97 Thus, early in the growth of the employment-at-
will doctrine, freedom of contract ideals created, and property rights
reified, a buffer around the doctrine. In deference to the employer's
"property" right to exercise business judgment, and in the absence of
93. See American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209
(1921) C'A single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer.... Union was essen-
tial to give laborers [an] opportunity to deal on equality with their employer."). Certain
classes of employees, such as low-wage unskilled workers, low-level management employ-
ees, regardless of race or sex considerations, are particularly affected by disparities in bar-
gaining power. Consequently, unionization and collective bargaining agreements typically
implement a "for cause" standard for discharge. See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at
Will us. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1413 (1967).
94. The classic example of this is in the area of contracts arising from employment
manuals and employee handbooks. Courts have generally held that an employer may avoid
the contract implications of an employment manual by placing a conspicuous disclaimer in
the manual. See, e.g., Dell v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 811 F.2d 970, 972-74 (6th Cir.
1987)- Robinson v. Christopher Greater Area Rural Health Planning Corp., 566 N.E.2d
768, 772 (111. App. Ct. 1978) (stating that a clear disclaimer negates any promise made in
an employee handbook or personnel policy). Additionally, employers typically reserve the
right to add, delete, or otherwise change the provisions of the manual. See Woolley v.
Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1270-71 (N.J. 1985) modified on other grounds by
Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985).
95. See Pound, supra note 75, at 454.
96. A contract does not affect an employee's at-will status unless it specifically states
a term of employment or states that discharge will occur only for just cause. Many employ-
ers require their workers to sign a document entitled "Employment Contract," yet the
workers remain at-will employees. Because the employer typically sets the terms of the
contract, the employer also controls the status of the employee as at-will or not.
97. See, e.g., Kumpf v. Steinhaus, 779 F.2d 1323, 1325-26 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that
the employment-at-will doctrine reinforces an employer's privilege to manage its corporate
affairs).
STATUS RULES
a contract that expressly limits this right, courts continue to apply
limitations to the rule cautiously.
C. Lessons from Hicks for the At- Will Rule
Despite the dominance of the at-will doctrine and its historical an-
tecedents, it remains difficult to rationalize Hicks fully as an at-will
decision. In Hicks, the court of appeals ruled in favor of the plaintiff
because the plaintiff succeeded in proving that the defendant's ar-
ticulated reasons for the adverse employment decision were pretex-
tual.98 Consequently, the defendant had not met its burden of ar-
ticulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse ac-
tion." The defendant was "in no better position than if [it] had re-
mained silent, offering no rebuttal to an established inference that
[it] had unlawfully discriminated against [the] plaintiff on the basis
of his race." 00 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, disagreed with
the appellate court's reasoning. The Supreme Court held that the
mere proffering of a nondiscriminatory reason, regardless of its per-
suasiveness, was sufficient to meet the burden of production, and
thus the defendants had in fact "placed themselves in a 'better posi-
tion than if they had remained silent."' 1 1 The Court further noted
that in the determination of whether a defendant has met its burden
of production, no credibility assessment takes place.'0 2 By producing
a nondiscriminatory reason, whether credible or not, the defendant
rebuts the legal presumption of intentional discrimination. 03
One might argue that the Court's interpretation and application
of evidentiary rules intrudes upon an employer's business judgment
by requiring the employer to produce a reason for its adverse deci-
sion. This is especially so considering that the at-will doctrine does
not require an employer to have any reason at all. By splitting the
analysis into a two-tier inquiry, "burden-of-production determina-
tion" and "credibility-assessment," the Hicks decision preserves the
essence of the at-will doctrine's sanction of no cause or bad cause dis-
charge. However, by taking the additional step of stating that the
credibility of what the employer produces is irrelevant to whether or
not the burden of production is met, the Court implicitly undermines
the strength of the at-will doctrine. If an employer has a bad reason,
or any reason other than discrimination for the adverse decision,
then the truth of his reason would be protected under the at-will doc-
trine. In fact, there is a reason to lie at the burden of production
98. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992).
99. See id.
100. Id.
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stage if discrimination motivated the adverse decision. There may be
other reasons to lie at the pretext stage, but the potency of the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine is that it protects any reason other than a
discriminatory one. Forcing the employer to articulate the true rea-
son would reinforce the rule and protect the employer. However, the
true reason may also reveal unconscious racism. The Hicks decision
could have preserved the at-will doctrine without reducing the bur-
den of production to a level where patently false assertions would
suffice. Indeed, if the Hicks Court had insisted on truthful, even if
morally reprehensible, reasons at the burden of production stage,
then the employment-at-will doctrine would have been better served.
The Hicks decision represents a significant and recurrent theme
in American legal tradition-a reification of property rights as an ab-
solute doctrine leading to the preservation of status. This theme is
rooted in an instinctive affinity for the economic theory of the late
nineteenth century, a theory that emphasized freedom of contract. In
short, the employment-at-will doctrine reflects "the law's develop-
ment of a fundamental principle of economy.'' 4
III. IT'S ALL IN THE EVIDENCE, OR ISN'T IT?: THE NATURE OF
DISCRIMINATION AND THE MATERIALITY OF THE INTENT REQUIREMENT
You have heard that it was said to those of old, 'You shall not
commit adultery.' But I say to you that whoever looks at a woman
to lust for her has already committed adultery with her in his
heart. 05
For as he thinks in his heart, so is he.1"6
The intent requirement as a measurement of liability has a long
legal history. Evaluation of intent, broadly speaking, is a means of
making a value judgment about the exercise of individual will under
a given set of circumstances. In each area of law where intent is re-
quired, liability ideally corresponds with intent as one way of effec-
tuating the law's broader purpose as an instrument of social order.
Despite the fundamental role that intent plays within our legal sys-
tem, there is no precise definition of what it means, nor are there
guidelines on how to establish its presence. In tort law, intent at one
104. Feinman, supra note 51, at 118. Feinman points out two ways that the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine facilitated the development of an advanced capitalist economy: (1)
the employment-at-will doctrine maintained the distinction between owners and non-
owners of capital, thereby allowing owners of capital (employers) to exercise control over
their enterprises; and (2) the employment-at-will doctrine facilitated discharge of employ-
ees when turbulent markets or technological changes necessitated a reduced labor force, or
even in situations where the employer deemed discharge necessary. See id. at 132-33.
Feinman describes these two elements as "essential elements of traditionalist capitalist
systems." Id. at 134.
105. Matthew 5:27, 28 (New King James).
106. Proverbs 23:7 (New King James).
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level is an organizing concept, distinguishing two major categories of
torts: negligence and intentional torts. 10 7 In criminal law, intent is a
general requirement as to the state of mind of an individual for the
purpose of determining criminal culpability and levels of culpabil-
ity."'8 While intent is a significant feature in both of these areas of
law, there is no uniform definition of "intent," nor is there any inter-
nal consistency as to what constitutes intent for the different kinds of
torts or crimes that the law recognizes. For example, while every
crime requires some mental element, the Model Penal Code recog-
nizes four different kinds of culpability for the purposes of estab-
lishing criminal liability."0 9 The definition of a crime usually incorpo-
rates a specific level of culpability necessary to establish the requi-
site mental element. 1 0 Grades of crimes and corresponding levels of
culpability, or intent, reflect societal views as to the appropriate
punishment for a particular state of mind.1
In torts, intent generally refers to a state of mind regarding an act
or omission with a purpose or desire to bring about given conse-
quences or a belief or knowledge that given consequences are sub-
stantially certain to result from the act."' This state of mind must
107. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 8, at
33 (5th ed. 1984).
108. One example of this is the distinction between general intent and specific intent,
where the latter refers to a special mental element beyond that generally required in refer-
ence to the physical act of the crime committed. Common law larceny requires the mental
state required for taking and carrying away the property of another, in addition to the ex-
tra element of the intent to steal. In a similar vein, common law burglary requires a men-
tal state manifested in breaking and entering into the dwelling place of another and the
additional element of intent to commit a felony therein. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.5, at 224 (2d ed. 1986) (distinguishing intent
from knowledge and discussing the various "kinds" of intent and the various things intent
is used to denote).
109. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)-(d) (1985). Under the Code, "a person is not
guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently." Id. at
§ 2.02(1).
110. See generally id. § 2.02(1), (3) (regarding the general requirements of culpability).
111. Thus, under the Model Penal Code, where a statute provides that distinctions be-
tween grades or degrees of an offense depend on the mental state of the offender, the Code
posits that the grade or degree of the conviction should "be the lowest for which the deter-
minative kind of culpability is established with respect to any material element of the of-
fense." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(10) (1985). The American Law Institute's commentary
in section 10 indicates that the drafters saw a correlation between the defendant's state of
mind and the value of the defendant's conduct. According to the Code, where the grade of
an offense depends on the level of culpability, "a person's culpability should be determined
by the lowest level of culpability he exhibits with respect to a material element. The of-
fenses for which the Model Code accepts a departure from this general approach are com-
paratively few." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(10) commentary at 252 (1985).
112. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 107, § 8, at 34; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 8A (1965) ("The word 'intent' is used throughout the Restatement . . . to denote
that the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or that he believes that the con-
sequences are substantially certain to result from it.").
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exist at the time the act or omission occurs.13 As in criminal law, a
defendant's liability in tort ideally reflects a value judgment as to the
results or consequences of the actor's particular state of mind.
[T]he defendant's liability is least where the conduct is merely in-
advertent, greater for acts in disregard of consequences increas-
ingly likely to follow, greater still for intentionally invading the
rights of another under a mistaken belief of committing no wrong,
and greatest of all where the motive is a malevolent desire to do
harm. 
4
Also similar to criminal law, intent is defined specifically for differ-
ent kinds of torts."15
113. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 107, § 8, at 34.
114. Id. at 37.
115. For the intentional tort of battery, the first Restatement of Torts defined "intent"
as an act done
for the purpose of causing the contact or apprehension or with knowledge on
the part of the actor that such contact or apprehension is substantially certain
to be produced .... [B]ut unless he realizes that to a substantial certainty, the
contact or apprehension will result, the actor has not that intention which is
necessary to make him liable under the rule stated in this Section.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. d., at 29-30 (1934). For the tort of assault, intent
involves "[an act ... done with the intention of putting the other in apprehension of an
immediate and harmful or offensive contact if it is done for the purpose of causing such an
apprehension or with knowledge that, to a substantial certainty, such apprehension will
result." Id. § 21 cmt. d, at 49. For false imprisonment, a person acts intentionally if "he in-
tend[s] to confine the other or a third person or that he know[s] that such confinement will,
to a substantial certainty, result. The actor's motives ... are immaterial." Id. § 44 cmt. a,
at 84.
Although the first and second Restatements of Torts utilize the same definition of intent,
they emphasize different facets of the requirement. Under the first Restatement, a person
acts with intent when he is aware of the consequences of his acts. See id. This emphasis on
knowledge as a measure of intent was limited to specific quasi-criminal torts. See id. On
the other hand, the second Restatement emphasizes an objective standard, closer in appli-
cation to recklessness or an aggravated form of negligence, when a person's subjective
state of mind is not as dominant a factor. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
However, commentators have observed that as tort law is increasingly viewed as an "in-
strument of admonition evidenced by the increased use of punitive damages, a defendant's
state of mind, as conceived under the first Restatement, will be increasingly relevant in de-
termining the degree of liability imposed." David J. Jung & David I. Levine, Whence
Knowledge Intent? Whither Knowledge Intent?, 20 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 551, 566-67 (1987)
(tracing the evolution of the definition of intent under the first and second Restatements).
It is important to note that there are differing views as to whether intent is always
tested by a subjective standard or whether it is sometimes sufficient to show that a rea-
sonable person should have known that the consequences of the act were substantially cer-
tain to result even if the actor did not intend those consequences. This is sometimes re-
ferred to as constructive intent. See id. at 556. A third distinct idea is whether knowledge
intent, as opposed to purpose intent, is sufficient for proving intent for tort purposes. See
generally id. (examining the second Restatement's treatment of knowledge intent).
"Knowledge intent" refers to the idea that the actor subjectively knows that the conse-
quences of his act are substantially certain to result, while "purpose intent' refers to the
idea that the actor consciously desires those consequences. See id. at 552 n.1. The first Re-
statement's position is that knowledge intent is sufficient only for some intentional torts
while the second Restatement holds that knowledge intent is sufficient for all intentional
[Vol. 26:49
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The question of how to establish and what would suffice as proof
of intent is peculiarly problematic in the area of discrimination. In
tort law and criminal law, the effects of the act generally serve as
evidence of intent.1 16 For intent to be present in tort, the defendant
must desire the act, whether the determination of that desire is an
objective or subjective evaluation."' However, the difficulty with us-
ing an awareness test in assessing discrimination cases is that dis-
crimination may exist and be manifested without the defendant's
conscious knowledge.
A. Discrimination as a Function of Status
Discrimination can be a passive moral state that exists in the
heart without any conscious awareness of its existence or of how or
when it may manifest in specific acts, speech, or decisions. 18 For ex-
ample, the comment, "I see why they used blacks as slaves-they are
so strong," made by a friend while I was lifting a suitcase may not
indicate intent in the conscious sense. However, there is certainly a
manifestation of discrimination if I am later asked to lift the heaviest
of several cases because "I am the strongest." In Slack v. Havens,"19
comments such as "colored people are hired to clean because they
clean better" were held to be evidence of discriminatory intent.120 If
the defendant sincerely believed that "colored people" are gifted
cleaners, is the defendant guilty of discrimination? More signifi-
cantly, is the defendant liable for discrimination? One could surely
argue that a sincere belief does not provide the intent basis on which
liability rests, even though discrimination is present.
Discrimination may be consciously or unconsciously intended; it
may be well-intentioned or motivated by malice.'' In the example
torts. Jung and Levine disagree with this interpretation of the second Restatement and ar-
gue that it endorses the objective standard, or "constructive intent." See id. at 574-89.
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965); MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.02(2)(a)-(d) (1985).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
118. See, e.g., Robert Caton, What is a Racist?, NEwSDAY, Apr. 21, 1996, at A44 (com-
menting that people are not necessarily deemed racists because they believe one race is
better than the other, but they are deemed racists because of their social views); Richard
Powelson, Are Officers on Duty After Shifts End, KNOXVILLE NEwS-SENTINEL, Mar. 17,
1996, at F2 (noting that the U.S. Department of Justice has concluded that it is not illegal
for FBI agents to tell racist jokes while on camping trips). These commentaries testify to
the fact that intent as a measure of liability for discrimination cannot possibly account for
the various ways in which discrimination exists. Jokes, after all, are not intended to mean
anything.
119. 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975).
120. Id. at 1093, 1095.
121. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 324 (1987) (explaining uncon-
scious racism in terms of Freudian and cognitive psychology). Lawrence points out that
"according to Freud, the mind protects itself by denying the emotionally-based ideas and
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above, the comment as to the physical ability of black people is based
on a stereotype about race. There is no doubt in my mind that my
friend did not intend to offend me, but she nevertheless made a
judgment about my ability based on nothing more than my race. The
assignment of tasks based on her belief would be useful as evidence
of discrimination only because she had verbally expressed herself
earlier, and so the causal element required by law could have been
established. Assume she assigned tasks with this in mind but made
no comment, or made a comment but no act reflecting her convic-
tion--discrimination, albeit unintended, still exists. Yet, under the
framework for proving discrimination, the case in the last two sce-
narios would have been difficult, if not impossible, to establish.
Generally, our system of law and order does not care what an in-
dividual's state of heart is, yet it requires that a particular state of
heart exists before finding liability for discriminatory action, as
though discrimination can be turned on and off at will. Examples of
such comments are numerous 12  and are used as direct evidence of
discrimination under Title VII. 23 Such evidence serves as a passport
for those cases where indications of race-consciousness on the part of
the employer make it impossible for a court to dismiss claims of dis-
crimination easily.12 4 But without evidence of such expressions, in a
world where the only two possible occupations are to lift suitcases or
to supervise the lifting of suitcases, I would be better "qualified" to
lift suitcases because I am "stronger." More likely than not, my chil-
dren will also be presumed better qualified to lift suitcases. In a
beliefs that conflict with what an individual has intellectually learned is good and right."
Id. at 322. He explains that, according to cognitive theory, people attain some of their most
strongly held beliefs through the observation and experience of culture, unaware that they
are absorbing these lessons. See id. at 323.
122. See Boutros v. Canton Reg'I Transit Auth., 997 F.2d 198, 201 (6th Cir. 1993)
(statements calling plaintiff a "camel jockey" and "rug peddler"); see also Lawrence, supra
note 121, at 339-44 (discussing examples of unconscious racism in everyday life); The Na-
tion, TIME, Oct. 16, 1964, at 31, 36 ("You have to remember that Americans can't do that
kind of work. It's too hard. Mexicans are really good at that. They are built low to the
ground, you see, so it's easier for them to stoop." (quoting former U.S. Senator George
Murphy speaking of crop harvesting)); Murray Chass, Campanis Is Out; Racial Remarks
Cited by Dodgers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1987, at B13 (quoting Al Campanis, vice-president of
the Los Angeles Dodgers, who explained that there were no black executives in major
league baseball because "they may not have some of the necessities to be, let's say, a field
manager or general manager").
123. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (finding that sug-
gestions that the plaintiff should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry" may constitute direct
evidence of sex-biased decision making); Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir.
1975) (holding that such comments as "colored people are hired to clean because they clean
better" and "colored people should stay in their places" are evidence of discriminatory in-
tent).
124. But see Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 721 F. Supp. 1397, 1431 (D. Mass. 1989) (dis-
missing decision makers' stereotyped comments that "women were not successful in the
[Harvard Business School] classroom" as not probative of sex discrimination).
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similar fashion, family relations or caste systems under feudalism
dictated what occupations the next generation could or would under-
take. This is because in a society distinguished by property owner-
ship, status begets status. Consequently, in this world of lifters ver-
sus supervisors, the decisionmaker is the "owner" of the factory, and
in my children's generation, the owner's son is more likely to be the
new "owner."
Status not only serves to determine which job a person is likely to
hold, it also helps to determine the value that is placed on that job.
Value is often a reflection of one's status as black or white, woman or
man. This phenomenon is observed more patently in the area of sex
discrimination. 2 ' Thus, wages for occupations historically dominated
by women have risen with the increase in the number of men in
these occupations. 26 Another example is the phenomenon of the glass
ceiling that constrains women's advancement in corporate America
with no obvious malice or discrimination to blame. 12 7 On the other
hand, in the area of race discrimination, the emphasis is on the value
of the individual occupying the position. This value is the repository
for discrimination even where the job is ostensibly a successful one. 1 8
In this situation, the impact of discrimination is not immediate and
often not felt until there is an opportunity for advancement to the
highest ranks, where job value and personal value converge. Intent,
125. Although men and women may in some instances perform the same duties, there
still remains a gap between men's and women's wages. As recently as 1992, women in
America earned only $0.71 for every dollar earned by men. See The Fair Pay Act of 1994:
Hearings on H.R. 4803 Before the Joint Subcomm. of House Educ. and Post Office and Civil
Serv. Comm., 103d Cong. 53 (1994) (statement of Michele Leber, Treasurer, National
Comm. on Pay Equity). Status also plays a role in equality of promotion in male-dominated
vocations, such as law and accounting. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)
(finding that sex stereotyping may have played a part in evaluating a female accountant's
partnership candidacy); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (holding that
partnership decisions are subject to Title VII).
126. This is reflected in wage disparities, where men earn more than women in the
same occupation. See Marion Crain, Between Feminism and Unionism: Working Class
Women, Sex Equality, and Labor Speech, 82 Geo. L.J. 1903, 1913-14 (1994) (stating that
even within female-dominated occupations, men tend to earn more than women). "Both
nursing and bookkeeping are predominantly female occupations, with 93 percent female
employment. Male nurses earn an average of 10 percent more than female nurses, and
male bookkeepers earn an average of 16 percent more than women bookkeepers." Id. at
1914.
127. See Cynthia B. Lloyd, The Division of Labor Between the Sexes: A Review, in SEX,
DISCRIMINATION, AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR 14 (Cynthia B. Lloyd ed., 1975).
128. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Who's Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL.
L. REV. 893 (1995) (discussing the argument that blacks are intellectually inferior to
whites as found in RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE:
INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994)). Bell concludes that these
arguments enable white Americans to blame the social status of African Americans on in-
herent low intelligence while avoiding the real cause of inequality--oppressive racism and
open hostility toward any form of black success. See id. at 894.
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as a requirement for finding that discrimination exists, cannot even
begin to unravel the complex forces at play in a world like this.
B. Comparative Application of the Intent Requirement
The Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts were enacted to enforce the
antidiscrimination principle of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 12 9 These statutes, in particular 42 U.S.C. § 1981, pro-
vide important historical and legal reinforcement for the equal pro-
tection principle in the workplace. Although the statute remained
dormant for a significant period of time, they were revived during the
civil rights movement and together with Title VII, serve as important
avenues of redress for a variety of discrimination claims. The consti-
tutional roots of all the Civil Rights Acts should have strengthened
the application of the equality principle. However, modern equal pro-
tection jurisprudence focuses on intent as a primary element of a
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. With the Hicks decision,
proof of discrimination under Title VII has clearly modeled the Su-
preme Court's conservative treatment of discrimination claims.
1. Intent in Equal Protection Cases
While there are important differences between the requirements
of intent in criminal law and torts, the element of mental aware-
ness--or consciousness of action and/or result-is a critical part of
assessing the degree of liability despite its varying permutations for
specific crimes and torts. In disparate treatment and equal protection
cases, however, intent, in the purposeful sense, plays a significant
role in determining whether or not discrimination has in fact taken
place. Thus, unlike tort or criminal law where different degrees or
kinds of intent are used to measure the extent of liability, the pres-
ence or absence of intent in discrimination cases is what determines
the existence of liability.
In Washington v. Davis,131 the Supreme Court distinguished judi-
cial scrutiny of alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause from
scrutiny of alleged Title VII violations. In Davis, the plaintiffs chal-
lenged the validity of a qualifying test administered to applicants for
positions in the District of Columbia police force on the grounds that
the test had a disproportionately adverse impact on black appli-
cants.1 3 ' The district court rejected the allegation that the test in
question was written in a way that favored white applicants. 132 The
court held that the test was "reasonably and directly related to the
129. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980).
130. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
131. Seeid. at 232-33.
132. See Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D.D.C. 1972).
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requirements of the police recruit training program and that it [was]
neither so designed nor operate[d] to discriminate against otherwise
qualified blacks."'1 3
The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision 3 4 and
held that the critical fact was that four times more black applicants
failed the test than did white applicants.' 3 According to the court of
appeals, the absence of discriminatory intent in the administration
or design of the test was irrelevant.'36 The disproportionate impact of
the test created an inference of a constitutional violation, which
could be rebutted only with evidence that the test was an adequate
measure of job performance as well as an indicator of probable suc-
cess. 37 The court concluded that the employer had failed to meet its
burden of persuasion and thus ruled in favor of the black appli-
cants. 38
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that disproportionate im-
pact alone is insufficient to maintain a constitutional violation. 139 The
Court distinguished the rigorous evidentiary persuasions required of
a defendant in Title VII cases and declined to extend the same level
of judicial scrutiny to equal protection cases. 43 According to the
Court, "the basic equal protection principle[s] [require] that the in-
vidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.''4 Thus,
under equal protection analysis, intent to discriminate is always a
requirement for culpability and liability. As distinct from tort law,
intent under this framework is "purpose intent," requiring that the
defendant wished or purposely desired the discrimination, as op-
posed to "knowledge intent," that is, knowing that discrimination is
certain to occur. Similarly, in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,1
the Supreme Court upheld a lifetime preference to military veterans
for state civil service positions in Massachusetts, even though the
preference disproportionately advantaged males. The Court held that
discriminatory purpose:
implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of con-
sequences .... It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a
state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of ac-
133. Id.
134. See Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
135. See id. at 960.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 961-63.
138. See id. at 965.
139. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ('A purpose to discriminate
must be present .... (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945))).
140. See id. at 247-48.
141. Id. at 240.
142. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
1998]
76 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tion at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse
effect upon an identifiable group.1
43
2. Intent in Employment Law Cases
Under Title VII, a discrimination claim may proceed under two
theories: disparate treatment and disparate impact.' 44 Similar to
Washington v. Davis,1' disparate impact cases deal with facially neu-
tral employment practices that have a disproportionately adverse
impact on a protected group. The disparate impact theory was first
recognized in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,' 6 and was later codified in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.14 1 The Griggs court recognized two ele-
ments vital to Title VII's viability as an instrument for fostering
equality. First, prospects for equal opportunity are directly linked to
the ability of courts to apply antidiscrimination laws in a manner
that recognizes the scars of racism reflected by the effects of past ra-
cism on present opportunities.'" Second, discrimination may be un-
intended and even unconscious but, nevertheless, real.149 The un-
precedented Griggs holding made it possible for the most insidious
forms of racism to be challenged before a court of law. Indeed, given
the impossibility of reducing racism to one single attitude, process, or
state of mind, it is not farfetched to say that the disparate impact
theory may now be a more valuable tool in the struggle for a dis-
crimination-free work environment than the disparate treatment
theory. This is because the disparate impact theory permits a finding
of discrimination regardless of intent. 5
Unlike disparate impact, disparate treatment claims focus on pat-
ently unequal terms of employment between a member of a protected
group and another individual who is typically not a member of a tra-
ditionally protected group. Disparate treatment requires that a
plaintiff prove that the unequal treatment is the product of an intent
to discriminate. Intent to discriminate is often proven by circumstan-
143. Id. at 279. See also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) (holding that the racially discriminatory impact of a village's de-
nial of a rezoning application was insufficient to prove an Equal Protection violation).
144. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (explaining the dif-
ference between the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories); see also Jeffrey A.
Blevins & Gregory J. Schroeder, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Congress Revamps Employ-
ment Discrimination Law and Policy, 80 ILL. B.J. 336, 339 (1992) (indicating that section
105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 expressly endorses the judicially created disparate im-
pact theory).
145. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
146. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
147. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at various sections of 42
U.S.C.).
148. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.




tial evidence, as direct evidence of discrimination is rarely avail-
able.' The seminal case establishing the disparate treatment
framework for an action brought pursuant to an alleged Title VII
violation is McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,"2 in which the Su-
preme Court clarified "the standards governing the disposition of an
action challenging employment discrimination .... ,,53 Under the
framework, to establish a prima facie case or, more accurately, a re-
buttable presumption of discrimination, 5 4 a plaintiff must prove sev-
eral elements: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2) the
plaintiff applied and was qualified for the job; (3) the plaintiff was
rejected despite his/her qualifications; and (4) after the rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek appli-
cants from persons of complainants' qualifications, or the employer
filled the position with a person who was not a member of a protected
class. 55
In the cases following McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court
further clarified some of the foregoing elements of the prima facie
case. For example, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation
Co.,156 the Court held that the provisions of Title VII offer protection
to all individuals from disparate treatment because of their race and
not only to members of historically recognized minority groupS.
1
17
The McDonald Court described the first element of the prima facie
case as typical of the most common sort of case."5 8 Thus, the first
element of the McDonnell Douglas framework is susceptible to the
vagaries of a particular fact pattern. For example, a white male could
ostensibly make out a prima facie case where whiteness equals the
proven characteristic that was discriminated against, even though
white males are not traditionally considered a minority group.
151. Recently, secret tape recordings exposed the racist corporate culture of Texaco.
Corporate executives allegedly belittled black employees and plotted the destruction of evi-
dence in the race case. See Judge OKs Texaco Bias Settlement, FLORIDA TODAY, Mar. 27,
1997, at 12C. The court approved a $176 million dollar settlement, the largest settlement
of its kind in U.S. history. The case reveals the rarity of direct evidence and the blatant in-
vidiousness of discrimination in this corporation.
152. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
153. Id. at 798.
154. The Supreme Court refers to this as the "prima facie" case. However, in the con-
text of the Court's opinion, the first step is actually a presumption because the required
elements are simply basic facts of the rebuttable presumption of the presumed fact of dis-
crimination.
155. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
156. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
157. See id. at 278-79 (holding that white plaintiffs stated a claim under Title VII
where they alleged that the defendant employer discriminated against them on the basis of
their race when the employer discharged them for misappropriating cargo and retained a
black employee who was charged with the same offense).
158. See id. at 279 n.6.
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In Texas Department of Community Affairs u. Burdie,59 the Su-
preme Court focused on the role of the evidentiary standards in a Ti-
tle VII action. The Court reiterated the basic allocation of evidentiary
burdens.' First, the plaintiff shoulders the burden of proving a
prima facie case of discrimination.6 1 If the plaintiff is successful, the
burden shifts to the defendant who must offer a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the adverse employment decision. 6 ' If the de-
fendant carries this burden, the plaintiff then is afforded an oppor-
tunity to prove that the reasons offered by the defendant were
merely a pretext for discrimination.'
63
The Court proceeded to elaborate on the nature of the burden-
shifting requirements:
The nature of the burden that shifts to the defendant should be
understood in light of the plaintiffs ultimate and intermediate
burdens. The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that
the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff re-
mains at all times with the plaintiff .... The McDonnell Douglas
division of intermediate evidentiary burdens serves to bring the
litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to this ultimate
question.' 64
C. The Doctrinal Consistency of Hicks
Commentators on the Hicks decision have disagreed about the
Supreme Court's use of previous Title VII decisions. The interpreta-
tion of the Hicks decision is torn between those who read it as rede-
fining the scheme set out in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine 65 and
those who read the decision as merely refining McDonnell Douglas
and Burdine.66 While one may oppose the practical and substantive
repercussions of Hicks, a careful study of McDonnell Douglas and
Burdine reveals that Hicks properly applied the standards set in
Burdine. The Burdine Court did not hold that judgment for the
plaintiff follows as a matter of law once the plaintiff demonstrates
pretext. Rather, the Court insisted that "[t]he plaintiff retains the
burden of persuasion .... This burden now merges with the ultimate
159. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).




164. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas and Board of Trustees of Keene State College v.
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 n.2, 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (1978)). Again, the Court's lan-
guage is misleading because preponderance of the evidence is a standard of persuasion.
165. See Corbett, supra note 9; Smith, supra note 9.
166. See Malamud, supra note 17.
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burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of inten-
tional discrimination. '" '6 7
Because the burden of persuasion never shifts, the plaintiff in a
Title VII action must ultimately persuade the trier of fact that the
employer discriminated against the employee. Before courts reach
this ultimate question, however, the defendant must carry the bur-
den of producing evidence that will rebut the presumption of dis-
crimination. 6 s The plaintiff, then, has the burden of persuading the
trier of fact that the defendant's proffered reasons were pretextual-
that a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether discrimination was
actually the motivation for the employer's adverse action.169 The
plaintiff does this by persuading the court that the employer's expla-
nation is invalid and that a discriminatory reason more likely moti-
vated the employer. 7 This could lead to an inference that the plain-
tiff has satisfied her burden once pretext is shown. However, the
Hicks Court does not explicitly hold this way in favor of the plaintiff.
Rather, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion that the
proffered reason was a pretext and that, therefore, the employer's
adverse decision was the product of discrimination.' 7
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,"7 ' the
Supreme Court described the McDonnell Douglas scheme as one that
permits a presumption of discrimination to be made once the most
common reasons for an adverse employment decision are elimi-
nated. 7 ' By interpreting the standard for rebuttal as imposing only a
burden of production, the Hicks decision thwarts the purpose for the
presumption while also invalidating the substantive goal of this pro-
cedural framework. While an employer may lie about the reason for
the adverse employment decision, an employee must still prove in-
tent to discriminate. If an employer lies about the reason for the ad-
verse employment decision in meeting its burden of production, why
should the court believe the truth of the evidence offered about intent
to discriminate? If an unsupported lie satisfies the burden of produc-
tion, then the employer has no reason or incentive to investigate,
confront, and deal with the presence of discriminatory attitudes that
may lead to discriminatory behavior in the workplace. If a plaintiff
167. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. It is certainly plausible to read Burdine as mandating
judgment for the plaintiff, particularly because the Court explains that the plaintiff may
"succeed" in satisfying this burden. See id.
168. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993). Having the bur-
den of production, the defendant must present admissible evidence that would support a
finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action. See id.
169. See id. at 507-08.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
173. See id. at 358 n.44.
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proves the falsity of the employer's proffered reason, along with the
other elements of a viable discrimination claim, the defendant em-
ployer, at the very least, should be required to bear the ultimate bur-
den of persuasion of its proffered reason. Any other rule simply
overlooks the possibility that discrimination may have been the real
reason. In other words, the question of whether discrimination actu-
ally exists is not the same as whether the defendant intended, de-
sired, or had the conscious purpose of discriminating. Indeed, the
question of whether the defendant had such an intention, desire, or
conscious purpose is virtually irrelevant to the determination of
whether it actually discriminated.
D. Doctrine as Discrimination
Another striking facet of the intent requirement in disparate
treatment cases is the way in which it undercuts a fundamental goal
of Title VII-to preclude decisions based on stereotypes. 174 A stereo-
type serves as a proxy for truth and reduces the cost of information
gathering. 175 When an employer makes a decision based upon a
stereotype, this decision, while clearly discriminatory, is not neces-
sarily the product of a conscious awareness or desire for a particular
outcome. Instead, a stereotype may be an honest conviction about a
characterization. Stereotyping is one obvious example of a state of
mind that may not satisfy the intent test required but, nonetheless,
has been held to constitute a violation of Title VII.17 6 Unintended dis-
174. See Ramona L. Paetzold & Rafael Gely, Through the Looking Glass: Can Title VII
Help Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceiling?, 31 Hous. L. REv. 1517, 1534-35
(1995) (noting that Title VII's "failure to assist women and minorities adequately in ad-
vancement and promotion is due in part [to] persistent stereotypes").
175. See Mary Stevenson, Women's Wages and Job Segregation, in LABOR MARKET
SEGMENTATION 243, 251 (Richard C. Edwards et al. eds., 1975) (suggesting that strong
prejudice based upon perceptions of ability as a function of a person's sex leads employers
to believe that women are not worth hiring because they would be inefficient workers); see
also Lloyd, supra note 127, at 14 (explaining wage differences between individuals and
groups from a human capital approach based on differences in productivity). Variables
such as education and, particularly, experience are used as stand-ins for productivity. See
id. Because women have not been in the labor force as long as men, the human capital they
accumulate tends to differ from that of men. Thus, employers are generally willing to pay
women less on the assumption that they are less productive than men. See generally Nad-
ine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment
Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. REV. 345 (1980) (arguing for an expanded concept of discrimina-
tion in order to dismantle attitudinal barriers that foster and protect inequality in the
workplace). Taub presents social science data to demonstrate why and how sex segregation
continues to dominate employment relations in spite of Title VII and argues that decision
making based on stereotypes should be recognized as discrimination per se. See id.
176. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989); see also 29 C.F.R. §
1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (pointing out that refusal to hire an individual based on a stereotyped char-




crimination can be the product of stereotyping.1 7  If an individual
employer chooses not to expend the resources and efforts to gather
information about an employee but, instead, relies on a stereotype, a
plaintiff should be able to prevail in a Title VII action without having
to prove that the defendant had the intent or conscious purpose to
discriminate.
Finally, the Hicks decision reflects the absence of any sense of
communal accountability or responsibility for racism. In criminal
law, inferring intent poses no substantial public concern nor raises
any outcry because crime has historically been thought of as an of-
fense against the community. The possibility that anyone could be
murdered or robbed is something with which most people can iden-
tify. This, coupled with the fact that the gravest effects of discrimina-
tion are invisible, explains society's easy acceptance of the use of cir-
cumstantial evidence as proof of culpability in criminal cases but, in-
creasingly, not in discrimination cases. 7 1 Intent in criminal law re-
flects more than a causal element of the crime: it is an explicit at-
tempt to evidence the wrong while also justifiably imposing sanction.
Thus, where intent is not established, one may not be guilty of the
crime charged but may still be guilty of a lesser crime.'79
When an employer makes an adverse decision based on a stereo-
type, positive or negative, the more appropriate test of discrimination
is volition rather than intent. As in other areas of law, the absence or
presence of intent may be a factor in determining the degree of li-
ability, but certainly not the existence of discrimination. Volition, as
a measure of discrimination, has as its underlying premise the idea
that an act is either a product of the heart or mind, or both. It would
allow discrimination in its infinite varieties and manifestations to be
addressed without the confining and unrealistic boundaries of a nar-
rowly defined intent requirement. 8 0 Volition in this regard would re-
flect three Judeo-Christian principles for evaluating responsibility
for an offense: (1) "For out of the abundance of the heart, the mouth
speaks;"'' (2) "But I say to you that whoever looks at a woman to
177. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Ap.
proach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1173 (1995).
178. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOrToM OF THE WELL (1992); Toni Morrison,
The Pain of Being Black, TIME, May 22, 1989, at 121.
179. See Kevin W. Saunders, Voluntary Acts and the Criminal Low: Justifying Culpa-
bility Based on the Existence of Volition, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 443, 471-74 (1988) (discussing
the repercussions of failed attempts at the crime of solicitation).
180. In Slack v. Havens, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 885 (S.D. Cal. May 15, 1973),
the trial court did just this when it found that Title VII requires only "that a defendant has
meant to do what was done; that is, the act or practice must not be accidental." Id.
181. Matthew 12:34 (New King James). Words or actions reflect a state of heart.
19981
82 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:49
lust for her has already committed adultery with her in his heart;" ' 2
and (3) "For as he thinks in his heart, so is he.' 8 3
These principles are not new ways of establishing liability. In-
deed, the Model Penal Code incorporates a variation of this model in
its structure for determining culpability.8 4 Such efforts to expand the
basis for guilt seek to incorporate the various aspects of human be-
havior into a framework based on a specific vision of society. This
approach to evaluating human behavior has also recently been the
subject of republicanist scholarly attention.8 5 For example, in crimi-
nal law, one scholar argues that virtue, rather than intent, should be
used as the measure of a person's actions. 88 Intent may reflect the
role of law as an instrument for regulating human behavior, but vir-
tue as a measure of the value of human conduct reflects the premise
on which the law rests, namely our vision of society as a whole.'87
The nature of discrimination is such that doctrinal measures of li-
ability, like intent, cannot alone determine the existence of discrimi-
nation.1 Like torts or criminal law, the legal framework for evalu-
182. Matthew 5:28 (New King James). The requisite guilt for the offense exists as soon
as an outcome is desired or conceived in the mind.
183. Proverbs 23:7 (New King James). This refers to the conscious awareness or knowl-
edge of what one is doing.
184. See Saunders, supra note 179, at 474-75 (arguing that even without a causal rela-
tionship between mind and body, criminal liability may be imposed where there is voli-
tion). Professor Saunders uses the analogy of accessory liability and inchoate crimes to
support his thesis that mind-body causation is not necessary for culpability under criminal
law. See id. at 469-75.
185. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN
SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996) (offering a civic republican interpretation of citi-
zenship and self-government); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What is Republicanism, and Is It
Worth Reviving?, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1695 (1989) (discussing the revival of republicanism
and the role it should take in modern government). Republicanism focuses on the "good so-
ciety" and those things necessary to achieve the good society, such as participation in gov-
ernment, a virtuous citizenry, and the pursuit of the common good. See id. at 1697.
186. See generally Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423
(1995) (arguing that a republican theory of criminal law explains the principles of blame
and punishment in criminal justice).
187. See id. at 1425 CThe law has a purpose, an end in view, which is to promote the
greater good of humanity. The criminal law serves that end by promoting virtue; that is, by
inquiring into the quality of practical judgment displayed by the accused in his actions.").
188. As one scholar explains:
Traditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about racial
matters are influenced in large part by factors that can be characterized as nei-
ther intentional-in the sense that certain outcomes are self-consciously
sought-nor unintentional-in the sense that the outcomes are random, fortui-
tous, and uninfluenced by the decision-maker's beliefs, desires, and wishes.
. [A] large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influ-
enced by unconscious racial motivation.
Lawrence, supra note 121, at 322. The requirement for intent has come under significant
scholarly attack. Professor Lawrence notes within the specific context of Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), that the criticisms of the intent requirement focus primarily on
two concerns. See id. at 319. First, the intent requirement places a heavy burden on the
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ating discrimination claims must be malleable enough to ferret out
discrimination in all its various manifestations. The test for proving
discrimination, as set forth by the decision in Hicks, reflects, yet
again, the inadequacy of legislative attempts to redress the incidence
of discrimination. It is clear that legislation, no matter how strongly
worded or well-intentioned, cannot correct or prevent discriminatory
attitudes or reach all manifestations of discriminatory practices. Un-
fortunately, though, legislative failure in this area is further rein-
forced by procedural rules that reduce discrimination to a test for in-
tent. Intent, as the paramount factor in determining liability, un-
dermines the potential of the legal system's ability to act as an ave-
nue to correct discrimination.
IV. RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION
In torts, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur provides an alternative
model for establishing legal responsibility for an act. Absent direct
evidence, negligence may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence requires that inferences be drawn from
proven facts. An 1865 opinion explained the res ipsa loquitur doc-
trine as follows:
There must be reasonable evidence of negligence.
But where the thing is shewn to be under the management of
the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose
from want of care. 8 9
The framework for the application of res ipsa loquitur requires
several elements: (1) the evidence must be of a kind that ordinarily
does not occur without negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency
or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and
(3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the plaintiff.190 An additional feature of res ipsa loqui-
tur is that evidence of the true explanation must be more readily ac-
wrong side of the dispute; and second, the effects of racial discrimination exist notwith-
standing and independent of discriminatory intent. See id. at 319-20. The bulk of criticism
has focused on the equal protection arena, but can apply to Title VII cases as well. This is
true because intent, under disparate treatment and equal protection is used for the same
purpose, despite the language in Davis to the contrary. For criticism of the intent require-
ment, see David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 935, 938 (1989), and Kenneth L. Karat, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 48-53 (1977).
189. Scott v. The London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 159 Eng. Rep. 665, 667 (Ex. 1865)
(emphasis added).
190. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 107, § 39, at 244.
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cessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff. 9' Prosser argues that
courts will look at the fourth element when they want to stretch the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 9 2 The element is justifiable on policy
grounds; it gives the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur some breadth and
facilitates the search for truth. Res ipsa loquitur should simply be a
way of proving circumstantial evidence. Some scholars argue, how-
ever, that res ipsa loquitur is not a method of proof but a way to al-
low a plaintiff to win without proving negligence, in other words,
substituting non-proof as evidence.' 9' Still others view res ipsa loqui-
tur as a way of treating as proved that which is not actually
proved.'14 In Buckelew v. Grossbard,5 the New Jersey Supreme
Court stated that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is rooted in a
"sound procedural policy of placing the duty of producing evidence on
the party who has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation
of the causative circumstances.'
96
A. Res Ipsa Loquitur and Its Prospects for Title VII
The res ipsa loquitur procedural framework provides a viable al-
ternative for Title VII cases. Where a plaintiff proves the prima facie
case and demonstrates that the defendant's proffered reason is pre-
textual, these facts, in a sense, speak for themselves. In Hicks, what
other reasonable inference could be drawn where all the non-
minority officers were retained even though some had engaged in the
same sort of behavior as the plaintiff, yet only the plaintiff, a black
male, was terminated? Applying the relevant elements of the res ipsa
loquitur framework, the inference of negligence requires that the de-
fendant must be in control of whatever caused the harm. In employ-
ment cases, this element is clearly met. The process that leads to the
employee's actual or constructive termination is squarely within the
191. See id. Controversy exists as to whether this fourth element is required. Prosser
and Keeton say it is not a required element and neither the first nor second Restatement
requires it. See id. § 39, at 255; William L. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37
CAL. L. REV. 183, 222 (1949) (arguing that acceptance of the disputed fourth element of res
ipsa loquitur would make "sheer ... ignorance the most powerful weapon in the law");
William L. Prosser, Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. L. REV. 241, 260
(1936) ("[N]o policy of the law . . . favor[s] ... permitting a party who has the burden of
proof in the first instance to obtain a directed verdict merely by a showing that he knows
less about the facts than his adversary.").
192. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 107, § 39, at 255.
193. See, e.g., Charles E. Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 1 U. CHI. L.
REV. 519, 523 (1933-34) (arguing that the fourth element is one of necessity providing a
substitute for direct proof of negligence only where such proof is unavailable); Louis Jaffe,
Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 7 (1951) (arguing that the usefulness of
res ipsa loquitur is dependent on the fourth element).
194. See, e.g., P.S. Atiyah, Res Ipsa Loquitur in England and Australia, 35 MOD. L.
REV. 337 (1972) (describing the basic views and policy considerations of res ipsa loquitur).
195. 435A.2d 1150 (N.J. 1981).
196. Id. at 1157.
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employer's control. It is on this premise that employers are, for ex-
ample, held liable for the environment at the workplace, which is a
principal focus of sexual harassment claims. l 7 The employer is usu-
ally the only one that has access to the evidence-the true reason-
for why the plaintiff was terminated.
The procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur has been as troublesome
in the practice of tort law as the Title VII McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine framework has been in the practice of employment discrimi-
nation law. Interestingly, the Hicks majority's explanation of the
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine procedural framework strongly echoes
the res ipsa loquitur procedural framework. Under res ipsa loquitur,
a jury may infer negligence, but this conclusion is not compelled.198
Most jurisdictions hold that the burden of persuasion remains on the
plaintiff and does not shift to the defendant, 99 and the burden of
production exists only to the extent that if the defendant does noth-
ing, the jury may rule against him. 00 Despite the burden of persua-
sion requirement, however, cases exist where the inference of negli-
gence is so clear from the facts that, in the absence of explanation,
the plaintiff wins.20 ' In some jurisdictions courts sometimes apply
what is essentially a strict liability test, requiring the defendant to
produce evidence explaining the accident or face liability.2 0 2 This pol-
icy of imposing the burden of persuasion on the defendant has been
explained as justifiable where the defendant owes some special re-
sponsibility to the plaintiff.?3 In other words, policy considerations
dictate where the burden of persuasion ultimately lies. In the final
analysis, the strength of inferences, drawn from a set of facts, varies
from case to case. This flexibility allows res ipsa loquitur to function
effectively as a means for channeling responsibility and allocating
burdens of proof in the torts context. The Hicks framework lacks this
flexibility. If there is, in fact, a commitment to a discrimination-free
work environment, courts must address the need to ascribe responsi-
bility for discrimination. Again, a disturbing aspect of Hicks is what
the decision suggests about society's unwillingness to assume collec-
tive responsibility for ensuring that race-based decision making, con-
scious or not, benevolent or invidious, is effectively combated by the
legal process.
197. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 2292-93 (1998) (holding em-
ployer vicariously liable for supervisor's sexual harassment of an employee through an
abuse of his authority).
198. See Imig v. Beck, 503 N.E. 2d 324, 329 (Ill. 1986).
199. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 107, § 40, at 258.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 259; see also Anderson v. Somberg, 386 A.2d 413 (N.J. 1978).
203. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 107, § 40, at 259.
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B. The Rules of Evidence and the Practice of Discrimination
We have no authority to impose liability upon an employer for al-
leged discriminatory employment practices unless an appropriate
factfinder determines, according to proper procedures, that the em-
ployer has unlawfully discriminated. We may, according to tradi-
tional practice, establish certain modes and orders of proof, in-
cluding an initial rebuttable presumption of the sort we described
earlier in this opinion, which we believe McDonnell Douglas repre-
sents. But nothing in the law would permit us to substitute for the
required finding that the employer's action was the product of un-
lawful discrimination, the much different (and much lesser) find-
ing that the employer's explanation of its action was not believ-
able. 204
The impact of the Hicks decision does not lie in the allocations of
the burdens of persuasion and production, but rather in the question
of how to satisfy those burdens. The rules that determine what satis-
fies a burden of proof reflect policy decisions. Further, evidentiary
rules demonstrate how the law's ultimate purpose of ascertaining the
truth may best be accomplished through a defined process.0 5 Ulti-
mately, what the specific allocations of McDonnell Douglas, Burdine,
and Hicks reflect is that those who have been victims of discrimina-
tion, who have borne its stigma and its pain, must somehow explain
to a neutral court why the result in question indicates the presence of
discrimination. This is the starkest indication that the courts have
yet to completely understand or believe that discrimination remains
a part of our modern society.
The Court's application of the evidence rules in Hicks ensured
that a certain result was not only appropriate but also inevitable.
Some have argued that the pretext-plus rule is the only fair way to
allocate evidentiary burdens in employment discrimination cases be-
cause it protects the business judgment of the defendant/employer
and does not assume that the employer's action was motivated by
discrimination.2 6 This reasoning is faulty for several reasons. First,
several areas of equal employment opportunity law exist where
courts have explicitly required that the defendant disprove that dis-
crimination caused an adverse employment decision.20 7 In other
words, regardless of the area of alleged discrimination and the corre-
204. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514-15 (1993).
205. See Peter M. Panken et al., Enployees' New Burden of Proof in Employment Dis-
crimination Cases: The Conservative Supreme Court Speaks, in ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT
LAW & LITIGATION 73, 75 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Nov. 30-Dec. 2, 1989).
206. See Smith, supra note 9, at 301-02.
207. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195-96 (1974) (interpreting
the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994), which prohibits sex discrimination in rates of
pay); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994) (requiring the respondent to demonstrate the
job relatedness of the challenged action).
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sponding structural framework, the essential component of most dis-
crimination laws has been to protect the beneficiaries of equal em-
ployment opportunity laws.
For example, under the Equal Pay Act (EPA),2 8 the burden of per-
suasion shifts to the defendant once the rebuttable presumption of
discrimination has been raised.2 9 This is established by proving that
workers of the opposite sex in the same establishment are receiving
different rates of pay, based on sex, for equal work. 10 The defendant
may rebut the inference of discrimination by proving one of the four
defenses to different pay scales between the sexes." Failure to meet
this burden results in a loss for the defendant.212 In Brennan, the
Court noted that this allocation of burdens "is consistent with the
general rule that the application of an exemption under the Fair La-
bor Standards Act is a matter of affirmative defense on which the
employer has the burden of proof. '213
Similarly, in disparate impact cases, once a plaintiff demonstrates
that a facially neutral employment practice has a disproportionately
adverse effect on members of a protected group, the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 imposes the burden of persuasion on an employer to demon-
208. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994).
209. See Brennan, 417 U.S. at 195-96 (holding that the employer failed to meet its bur-
den of proving that the difference in wages between male night employees and female day
employees was motivated by a factor other than sex). In Brennan, the defendant and em-
ployer, Corning, introduced a night shift. See id. at 191. At the time, New York and Penn-
sylvania law prohibited women from working at night. See id. The male employees that
were recruited to fill the new night shift inspectors' jobs demanded and received signifi-
cantly higher wages than female inspectors working the day shifts. See id. Corning later
eliminated all shift differentials, and after the law restricting night work for women was
amended, Corning opened up night shift jobs to women with enough seniority to bid for the
higher paying jobs as opportunities arose. See id. at 194. However, a new collective agree-
ment that eliminated all future wage differentials preserved a higher wage base for the
mostly male night shift inspectors hired under the old order. See id. The Secretary of Labor
sought to enjoin Corning from continuing to operate under a pay scale that perpetuated
the pay differentials between male and female inspectors working during the night shift
and to collect back pay for past violations. See id. Corning argued on appeal that the Secre-
tary had failed to prove an EPA violation because day shift work and night shift work are
not performed under similar working conditions as required by the Act. See id. at 197. The
Court looked at Corning's job evaluation plans and found that the plans did not treat the
time of day worked as a working condition. See id. 202-03. In fact, the Court found that
Corning's job evaluation plans treated the jobs equally. See id. Additionally, Corning's job
evaluation manager testified that the company did not consider time of day worked to be a
working condition. See id. at 203. The Court ultimately held that Corning failed to carry its
burden of persuasion that the higher rate paid to male night shift workers was "in fact in-
tended to serve as compensation for night work, [but] rather constituted an added payment
based on sex." Id. at 204.
210. See id.
211. See id. Under the EPA, an employer may defend pay differentials for equal work
on grounds of "(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other fac-
tor other than sex." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994).
212. See Brennan, 417 U.S. at 196.
213. Id. at 196-97.
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strate the business necessity or job relatedness of the practice in
question." 4 Indeed, under the 1991 Act, the defendant employer
bears both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. 15
Finally, in affirmative action cases under Title VII, the plaintiff
challenging the affirmative action program bears the burden of
proving that the program violates the provisions of Title VII.21 6 In all
of these different areas, burdens of persuasion are allocated in a
manner that protects the intended beneficiaries of the applicable
legislation.
Absent direct evidence of discrimination, presumptions assume a
central role as a procedural tool, either to allocate the burden of per-
suasion or the burden of production. This, in effect, was the focus of
the Court's decision in Hicks. The critical issue is to determine what
effect a presumption should be given. A presumption, appropriately
speaking, arises from a rule of law that creates a relationship be-
tween a basic fact and a presumed fact.2 17 The first step in the pre-
sumption process is the finding of the existence of a basic fact. This
fact, in turn, implies the presumed fact, which consequently requires
a legal finding of its existence. However, the party against whom the
presumption operates may defeat the finding of the existence of the
presumed fact by offering sufficient rebuttal evidence. 218 For exam-
ple, the basic fact that a child is born in wedlock gives rise to the pre-
sumed fact that the child is legitimate. 2 9 Similarly, the basic fact
that a letter is properly addressed, stamped, and put in the mail
gives rise to the presumed fact that the addressee received the let-
214. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994).
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established un-
der this chapter only if -
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular em-
ployment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity ..
Id.
215. See id. § 2000e-2(k) (1994); see also 137 CONG. REC. S15498 (daily ed. Oct. 30,
1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("The employer must come forward and meet the burden
not only of production.., but the burden of persuasion as well.").
216. See Chris Engels, Voluntary Affirmative Action in Employment for Women and
Minorities Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: Extending Possibilities for Employers to
Engage in Preferential Treatment to Achieve Equal Employment Opportunity, 24 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 731, 766 (1991).
217. See LEO H. WHINERY, 2 OKLAHOMA EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 9.03 (1994); see also EDMUND H. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 31
(1963).
218. See WHINERY, supra note 217, § 9.04.
219. See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 2527, at 584
(James H. Chadbourn ed., 1981); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 343, at 581 (John William
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter McCoRMICK].
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ter.220 The term presumption is also used, as was the case in Hicks,
as a rule of law to allocate the burden of producing evidence or of
persuading the factfinder.221
In the Title VII disparate treatment context, the fact that all other
similarly situated employees were retained and that the only minor-
ity employee was discharged should give rise to a presumption of dis-
crimination. Once the presumption is established, the party against
whom the presumption operates has the opportunity to rebut the
presumed fact. The nature of the rebuttal is determined by the par-
ticular effects of the rule that the court adopts. In Hicks, the Court
applied the traditional Thayer-Wigmore approach22 2 incorporated in
Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 223 requiring the party
against whom the presumption operates to produce evidence that
shows no causal relationship between the basic fact of discharge and
the presumed fact of discrimination. 224 The Morgan-McCormick ap-
proach 225 would treat this problem differently by not only requiring
the party against whom the presumption operates to produce evi-
dence, but also to bear the ultimate burden of persuasion that there
was no causal relationship between the basic fact of discharge and
the presumed fact of discrimination.2 26 Congress, however, rejected
this theory in favor of the Thayer-Wigmore approach of shifting only
the burden of producing evidence. 2 7 Consequently, in Hicks, the
mere assertion of a reason for the discharge was sufficient to rebut
the presumption of discrimination, even though the party in whose
favor the presumption operated had established that the asserted
reason was pretextual or untruthful. 22
Despite the Supreme Court's rigid presentation of the McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine framework, the rules of evidence regarding pre-
sumptions may be applied in such a way as to provide room for
courts to consider underlying policies. Even where presumptions are
220. See WIGMORE, supra note 219, § 2519, at 564; MCCORMICK, supra note 219, § 343,
at 581.
221. See generally St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
222. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW 314 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1898); WIGMORE, supra note 219, § 2491,
at 305.
223. See FED. R. EVID. 301 (1975).
224. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 518 (1993).
225. See MORGAN, supra note 217, at 34-37; MCCORMICK, supra note 219, § 344, at
586-88.
226. This approach to the effect of presumptions was adopted by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in promulgating the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence in 1974. See UNIF. R. EVID. 301(a) (1974) "A presumption imposes on the party
against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the non-existence of the presumed
fact is more probable than its existence." Id.
227. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 93.1587, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7098, 7099.
228. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 518.
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used as a tool to allocate burdens of production and persuasion, the
general purposes underlying presumptions are identified as public
policy, probability, procedural convenience, or any combination of the
three.22 9 Some states even provide that a court may consider the
strength of the public policy underlying a presumption in determin-
ing how to allocate the burden of persuasion.2 3 For example, the pre-
sumption of legitimacy for all children born in wedlock is a reflection
of a strong public policy to protect children from the social stigmati-
zation that may arise from bastardy.231 Illustrating the procedural
convenience of presumptions, one author has explained:
[T]he familiar presumption that evidence that the vehicle de-
scribed in the complaint was illegally parked and the defendant
named in the complaint was the registered owner at the time of
the violation constitutes a presumption that the registered owner
was the person who parked the vehicle where the violation oc-
curred. Here, apart from any support the presumption gains from
public policy and probability, certainly from a procedural stand-
point the defendant has immediate and readier access to the evi-
dence with which to rebut the presumed fact of the presumption.232
Similarly, in discrimination cases, the employer is in the best po-
sition to present evidence to rebut the presumption of discrimination.
Given the presumption that discrimination is a probable motive,
coupled with the procedural convenience of the presumption, no justi-
fiable or rational reason exists to allow an employer to simply assert
any reason, true or false, in satisfaction of the burden of production.
The result mocks any notion that there is a strong public policy
against discrimination. The proposed amendment to Rule 301 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence that reflected the Morgan-McCormick ap-
proach was justified on the ground that the underlying reasons for
creating presumptions did not justify giving a lesser effect to pre-
sumptions.213
Notwithstanding Hicks, plaintiffs can still make beneficial uses of
inferences of discrimination in Title VII discrimination lawsuits.
However, the Hicks decision will invariably curtail the extent to
which such inferences will be effective. Under Hicks, inferences are
sufficient to show intentional discrimination only when the trier of
fact disbelieves the reasons put forward by the defendant.23 4 How-
ever, even this result is not guaranteed by Hicks because Hicks limits
229. See McCORMICK, supra note 219, § 343, at 580.
230. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 603-606 (West 1997); FLA. STAT. §§ 90.301-.303
(1997).
231. See McCORMICK, supra note 219, § 343, at 581-82.
232. WHINERY, supra note 217, § 9.01, at 153 (emphasis added).
233. See Advisory Committee Note, Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 208 (1973).
234. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
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the effect of presumptions to the mere Thayer-Wigmore approach of
producing evidence. The importance of a fair, but realistic, process
for evaluating discrimination claims is too important to be left tee-
tering on the edge of a presumption that has been stripped of its
value, especially where the evidence produced is proven to be false.
The remaining question is whether an employer has truly met the
burden of production when its proffered reason has been disproved
by the plaintiff. Echoing Holmes's axiom that more than logic lies
behind a legal decision, one article recently noted that "[t]he seem-
ingly doctrinal rules that assign burdens of proof are not mere taxon-
omy; they conceal strong, normative policy decisions concerning who
should shoulder evidentiary risks and, more broadly, the desirability
of Title VII and the potential power it puts in the hands of work-
ers."
235
V. THE BROADER IMPLICATION OF HICKS: THE PRESUMPTION OF
EQUAL TREATMENT
In Liberty of Contract, Roscoe Pound asked, "[Why do so many
[courts] force upon legislation an academic theory of equality in the
face of practical conditions of inequality? ... Why is the legal concep-
tion of the relation of the employer and employee so at variance with
the common knowledge of mankind?" 36 Pound maintained that lib-
erty of contract was "a chief article in the creed of those who sought
to minimize the functions of the state, [and] that the most important
of its functions was to enforce by law the obligations created by con-
tract." '237 Consequently, because liberty to contract was treated as a
fundamental right, any attempt to encroach upon it, particularly in
the employment context, was unsuccessful.3 8
The decisions following Hicks have not fulfilled the dire predic-
tions of those who criticized the decision as sounding the death knell
for disparate treatment plaintiffs. Instead, the majority rule regard-
ing the procedural framework for disparate treatment after Hicks is
that a plaintiff may survive summary judgment if the plaintiff pro-
duces enough evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether
the employer's proffered reasons-were not the true reasons for the
adverse decision.239
For example, the Third Circuit has consistently interpreted Hicks
as allowing, although not mandating, judgment for the plaintiff
235. Developments, supra note 9, at 1579.
236. Pound, supra note 75, at 454.
237. Id. at 456-57.
238. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also supra notes 77.79 and ac-
companying text.
239. See, e.g., Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1067 (3d Cir.
1996) (en banc).
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where the defendant's reasons have been proven to be pretextual or
have been rejected by the court as untrue. 240 In EEOC v. Ethan Allen,
Inc. ,241 the Second Circuit held that once pretext is found, it "permits
the ultimate inference of discrimination. '242 Similarly, the Sixth Cir-
cuit construed Hicks as demonstrating:
that the only effect of the employer's nondiscriminatory explana-
tion is to convert the inference of discrimination based upon the
plaintiffs prima facie case from a mandatory one which the jury
must draw, to a permissive one the jury may draw, provided that
the jury finds the employer's explanation "unworthy" of belief.2 43
In addition, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) issued guidelines for enforcement of the Hicks decision. 44
According to the EEOC, "a prima facie case, coupled with a non-
credible justification from the employer, is sufficient to support a
finding of discrimination.1 45
Clearly, the use of inferences in the post-Hicks environment is
still viable, and there appears to be no formal threat to a plaintiffs
ability to make her case and avoid summary judgment once pretext
is shown. However, the question of how to prove discrimination re-
mains unresolved for cases in which a court holds that a reasonable
factfinder could not find that the employer's articulated reason was a
pretext for discrimination.24 The unspoken presumption in the post-
Hicks environment is that there is equal treatment in the workplace
and that defeat of the presumption requires direct or circumstantial
evidence of conscious discrimination. In Personnel Administrator v.
Feeney,2 47 the Supreme Court cautioned:
[A] n inference is a working tool, not a synonym for proof. When...
the impact is essentially an unavoidable consequence of a legisla-
tive policy that has in itself always been deemed to be legitimate,
and when . . . the statutory history and all of the available evi-
240. See id. at 1066-67 (citing Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refinery Corp., 72 F.3d 326,
331 (3d Cir. 1995); Waldron v. SL Indus., 56 F.3d 491, 502-03 (3d Cir. 1995); Sempier v.
Johnson & Higgens, 45 F.3d 724, 732-33 (3d Cir. 1995); Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759,
764 (3d Cir. 1994)).
241. 44 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 1994).
242. Id. at 120 (citing DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 170 (2d Cir.
1993)).
243. Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083 (6th Cir. 1994).
244. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 186, at 3363 n.3. (April 12, 1994). EEOC guidelines are not controlling
upon the courts but "are entitled to great deference." Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 74 (1986).
245. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 186, at 3363 n.3 (April 12, 1994).
246. See Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 262 (1st Cir. 1994).
247. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
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dence affirmatively demonstrate the opposite, the inference simply
fails to ripen into proof.'
Given the strong historical forces at play in the norms that under-
gird employment relations, Hicks will always raise the specter of how
to prove discrimination. For example, although the Sixth Circuit in
Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co.24 9 recognized that a jury
which finds the employer's reasons unworthy of belief may find dis-
crimination, the court stressed that the jury may not reject an em-
ployer's explanation unless there is a "sufficient basis in the evidence
for doing so."250 According to the court, "To allow the jury simply to
refuse to believe the employer's explanation would subtly, but inar-
guably, shift the burden of persuasion from the plaintiff to the defen-
dant, which we must not permit."25' Hicks evidences a disturbing
shift in the regulation of race relations away from an effort to facili-
tate and protect equal access and treatment in the employment con-
text. The Court has moved to a position where those who have la-
bored under the burden of unequal treatment now bear the burden of
disproving a presumption of a race-neutral work force. The socio-
economic philosophy of free market capitalism, reinforced by the
strong impulse to protect property rights, serves to keep things in
status quo. Until this system is discredited, or until the concept of
equality for all is infused with procedural and substantive rights su-
perceding the right to property, the rules of the workplace, in tandem
with the free market, will preserve and serve status interests.
Most discrimination does not occur intentionally in the sense of
invidious motivation.152 More often than not, discrimination is a state
of heart and mind that manifests itself in conscious or unconscious
assessments about attitudes toward, or decisions affecting, members
of a particular group. Different adjectives may be used to describe
various forms of discrimination such as ignorant discrimination,
careless discrimination, or unconscious discrimination. Regardless of
the terminology, however, all forms of discrimination are wrong. Al-
though, as a society, we impose lesser sanctions on ignorant dis-
crimination than we do on intentional discrimination, we cannot af-
ford the cost of failing to provide a viable recourse for all forms of dis-
crimination through the legal system. The cumulative effect of dis-
crimination, intended or otherwise, is ultimately economic, although
non-economic effects are just as devastating.2 53 Thus, it remains im-
248. Id. at 279 n.25.
249. 29 F.3d 1078 (6th Cir. 1994).
250. Id. at 1083.
251. Id.
252. See Krieger, supra note 176, at 1164.
253. See generally Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic
Empowerment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Ra-
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portant to determine what counts as discrimination, how to prove its
existence, and to do so based on a policy that gives breadth and depth
to the equality principle.
VI. CONCLUSION
The seeds of the Hicks decision were sown long ago in Burdine
when the Supreme Court held that the defendant in a Title VII ac-
tion need not persuade the trier of fact that it was motivated by the
reasons offered to rebut the presumption of discrimination. The Title
VII framework only requires that the defendant offer a reason, but
not necessarily the true reason, for its actions and the adverse em-
ployment decision. Underlying the Hicks decision and its precedents
is the familiar and often articulated conviction of courts and legisla-
tures that employers make efficient decisions and that courts and
legislatures should not interfere with those decisions. The Hicks de-
cision reaffirms the dominance of the employer's interests in the em-
ployment relationship and exemplifies longstanding judicial defer-
ence to the employer's judgment in that relationship. One danger
posed by Hicks is not the exacting evidentiary requirements that a
plaintiff must meet, but rather the reality that the jury's disbelief of
the defendant's articulated reasons will invariably be based on how
the jury understands the phenomenon of racism. This position, par-
ticularly at this point in history, is untenable for the jury system that
is increasingly scarred by vicissitudes of modern race relations. A
more potent danger posed by Hicks is that judicial reluctance to in-
terfere with the property rights of an employer, coupled with the lack
of any exact measure for determining the existence of discrimination
and the limited construction of the intent requirement, form a com-
plex structure that ultimately serves the interest of status preserva-
tion.2 54
cial Justice, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1994) (examining the economic institutions and
structures that produce the material inequalities reflected along racial lines); Richard H.
McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race
Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995) (arguing that status production is essential
to understanding race discrimination). McAdams defines discrimination as "a means by
which social groups produce status for their members." Id. at 1007. The author's central
thesis is that human motivation consists of nonmaterial factors such as self-esteem or
status-both group status and individual status-each reinforcing the other. "Discrimina-
tion and racist behavior are generally processes by which one racial group seeks to produce
esteem for itself by lowering the status of another group." Id. at 1044. For a similar point,
see BELL, supra note 178, at 195-200, and Morrison, supra note 178, at 121. "Even the
poorest whites, those who must live their lives only a few levels above, gain their self es-
teem by gazing down on us." BELL, supra note 178, at v.
254. This places minority groups, and particularly African Americans, in an ironic po-
sition. While their status as slaves historically precluded them from pursuing the benefits
of social and economic mobility, the combined effects of unchecked discrimination and the
at-will rule ensures that "the substance of [their lives remains] in another man's hands."
FRANK TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951).
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While the focus on evidence or other legal structures may produce
doctrinally correct results, such as the Hicks decision, this focus is
misplaced when the result would be to shield discrimination from
scrutiny. The allocation of the burdens of persuasion and production,
and the determination of how and what satisfies each burden, may
unwittingly serve as a proxy to facilitate discriminatory decisions
rather than a means to ferret them out. This result is inimical both
to the groups of people it operates against and to the broader vision
of becoming a society where all people are recognized. as created
equal under God. It is important to see justice as a moral value vin-
dicated through process and not as process or doctrine exalted over
truth. It is, perhaps, this truth that will set us free from the vicious
trap of status rules.

